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Preface 
This volume analyses the ozone layer of the earth as a global 
environmental resource. The ozone layer can be interpreted as 
the prototype of a public good that is used in equal amounts by 
all. No one can be excluded from its protecting services, and 
its depletion would affect everyone. Simultaneously, the ozone 
layer can be understood as a common property resource being 
characterized by free access, the absence of property rights 
or rules of use and by a zero price. 
The paper "Approaches to International Negotiations on the 
Chlorofluorcarbon Problem"(Gladwin, Ugelow, Walter) surveys 
the sector of the economy which produce fluorcarbons. An empi-
rical picture of the sectors in Europe and the United States is 
given. The regional origin of fluorcarbons in the world is dis-
cussed. The paper also analyses possible European reactions to 
the fluorcarbon policy of the United States. Starting from this 
empirical description of the given situation, the paper proceeds 
to discuss possible approaches to shared ozone management. The 
basic elements of a bargaining solution are developed. 
The paper "Reciprocal Transfrontier Pollution" (Pethig) attacks 
the issue of ozone management from a theoretical aspect and uses 
game theory in order to discuss potential solutions. The paper 
addresses non-cooperative behavior of polluters, unilateral regu-
lations and international bargaining. The Nash-solution, opti-
mal threat strategies and strategic manipulation of information 
are discussed. 
Both papers use the ozone problem as the empirical starting point 
of their analysis. The results can be easily applied to other 
global environmental resources such as the acid rain issue in 
the i~orthern Hemisphere. The basic concepts may also be applied 
to other public goods such as natural environments, i.e. the 
water quality of the oceans of the world. 
II 
The ozone problem represents an interesting contrast with the 
issue of regional environmental use discussed in the first book 
in this series. In the case of regional environmental systems 
such as a river system or an air shed it may be easier to find 
institutional arrangements for environmental quality management. 
(Water associations). Furthermore, it may be likely that indi-
viduals truly reveal their preferences by voting with their 
feet (Tiebout-theorem) either by interregional migration or 
by commuting. Finally, voting procedures are more easily 
implemented in a regional setting. In the case of global envi-
ronmental goods, all these aspects disappear and a solution 
beomes much more complicated. 
I would like to thank Maria Bednarek for typing the manuscript 
with grate care. Manfred Schnepf has prepared the diagrams and 
Wolfgang Vogt has been helpful in editing the book. 
Horst Siebert 
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Approaches to International Negotiations 
on the Chlorofluorcarbon Problem 
by 
Thomas N. Gladwin 
Judith L. Ugelow 
and 
Ingo Walter 
In the early 1980's the international dimensions of the 
chlorofluorocarbon problem will assume top priority in the 
United States. The reasons are obvious. By banning the use of 
CFCs in non-essential aerosols in April 1979,the U.S. cut its 
share of global emissions from about 50% to roughly 20%. 
Ongoing damage to stratospheric ozone to a large extent therefore 
involves predominantly non-u.s. sources. By acting unilaterally, 
the U.S. has presented the rest of the world with a "free ride"--
albeit at relatively modest cost--and may have seriously eroded 
its bargaining leverage in obtaining an international solution 
to the problem. Essentially, the U.S. has by its own actions 
turned the C1"C issue from a largely reciprocal or "bi-directional" 
problem of transfrontier pollution to one that is substantially 
more "uni-directional," with the American role undergoing 
change by degrees from polluter to victim. As the theory of 
transfrontier pollution clearly shows, this changes the nature 
Author Affiliations 
Thomas N. Gladwin isan Associate Professor of Management and 
International Business; Judith Ugelow is a Research Assistant 
in Economics; Ingo Walter is a Professor of Economics and 
Finance; all at the Graduate School of Business Administration, 
New York University, U.S.A. 
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of the U.S. role as initiator in the search for a global ozone 
management policy. Regardless of the intrinsic merits of the 
U.S. action on CFCs in non-essential aerosols, the challenge 
facing the United States in the years ahead may have become 
more difficult. 
From a purely national interest point of view as well, the 
nature of the problem has changed. Given its own perceptions 
of risk, damage functions, and degree of risk-aversion, U.S. 
r,olicy thus far has achieved some benefits at relatively modest 
cost--a substantial reduction of CFC emissions and presumed 
damage to global stratospheric ozone with relatively low-cost 
adjustment to replacement materials and applications. In the 
next phase, the costs to the U.S. of further unilateral action 
will be enormous, but the benefits without coordinated action 
abroad will be small. Again depending on risk, damage and cost 
issues, such action by the U.S. simply may not make sense. 
This paper examines the international dimensions of the 
CFC problem from a number of perspectives. We begin with an 
assessment of CFC policy outside the U.S., with emphasis on 
Western Europe, based on extensive interviews with individuals 
from industry, governments, and international organizations. 
This discussion is designed to describe the environment the 
U.S. faces in any further initiatives to move global ozone 
management ahead. The final section of the paper applies 
some principles of conflict management to the CFC problem 
and suggests a number of alternatives that appear reasonable 
the early 1980's. 
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It should be noted that, even prior to the U.S. ban on 
non-essential aerosol CFC use, world production was declining, 
as Exhibit 1 shows. From 1977 to 1978, fillings in North 
America declined 6.4%, in Europe 0.2% and in Oceania 12.7%. 
At the same time, fillings rose by 16.6% in South America, 15.9% 
in Asia, and 11.8% in Africa. On balance, world fillings 
declined by 1.2%. The U.S. share in 1977 was 39% of the total. 
In 1974, the contribution of aerosols to CFC usage was 65.9% 
in the OECD countries. Hence it seems unlikely that the 
reduction in CFC emissions brought about oy the U.S. will 
quickly be replaced by emissions elsewhere, allowing adequate 
time for the international initiatives that will ultimately 
be required to cope with the problem. 
European Reactions to U.S. CFC Policy 
Although most European governments have not yet enacted 
legislation or imposed regulations altering fluorocarbon use, 
it seems that some manufacturers and users have either ceased 
use of fluorocarbon or are preparing for such in response to 
the ozone controversy. This type of behavior tends to enhance 
the benefits of existing and proposed U.S. CFC measures. 
The collection of information for this study relied on 
interviews using a structured questionnaire. For the most 
part, the interviews were held with marketing and technical 
executives of fluorocarbon producers and related firms in the 
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air conditioning and refrigeration, polyurethane, aerosol, and 
auto air conditioning sectors. Although the names of these 
companies will not be disclosed, by agreement, each is a large 
contributor in it~ field. In addition, interviews were held 
with (a) the British Aerosol Manufacturers' Association (BAMA), 
(2) the British Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Association 
(BRACA), and (3) the Federation of European Manufacturers, 
(FEA), as well as representatives of (4) the Commission of the 
European Communities, and (5) the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development in Paris. Less structured inter-
views were appropriate in these cases, although discussions 
followed the general lines established in a questionnaire, 
specifically designed for the study. The questionnaire sought 
the following information: (a) company description, (b) 
industry description--national and international, (c) importance 
of fluorocarbons to the product, (d) effects to date from the 
fluorocarobon-ozone controversy, (e) expected or potential 
regulations, and (f) effects of U.S. regulation. Additional 
information was obtained through trade reports and magazines, 
and government documentation. A general finding is that 
Europe, with the exception of West Germany, remains in a 
pre-regulatory state in terms of the use of flurocarbons in 
aerosols. Much like the United States aerosol industry in 
1976, the European aerosol industry is preparing for and 
moving toward its own version of the alternative aerosol 
propellant--a flurocarbon-hydrocarbon mixture. Exhibit 2 
EIJR)PE CCEANIA 
Austria 38.3* Australia 
Belgiun 54.1* New Zealand 
Bulgaria 0.5 1977 
Cyprus 1.3 1976 
Czeclx>slovakia 48.0 
Oermll"k 11.5 AFRICA 
Finland 14.8* 
France 466.3* Algeria 
Germany: GFR 454.0* Angola 
CDR 34.0 can-eroun 
Great Britain 532.5* Dahaooy 
Greece 27.0 Egypt 
Hungary 5.0 Q}ana 
Iceland 0.3 Ivory O::>ast 
Ireland 5.0 Kenya 
Italy 192.5 Lybia 
Malta 1.0 Malawi 
Nether lams 143.4* Malgache Rep. 
Norway 13.0* Mauritius 
Poland 90.0 lt:lcant>ique 
Portugal 24.0 Morocco 
RLinania 16.6 Nigeria 
Spain 145. 7* i<ldesia 
Sweden 12.5* Senegal 
switzerland 52.6* South Africa 
Turkey 9.5 Swan 
USSR 160.0 SWaziland 
Yugoslavia 27.0* Tanzania 
TUnesia 
1977 2,580.4 Ugarrla 





1-brld Aerosol Statistics-1977 
(in millions of writs) 
IORl'H AMERICA 
124.0 canada 120.0 
14.0 U.S.A. 2,149.9* 
138.0 1977 2,369.9 
158.0 1976 2,425.0 
ASIA 
5.5 Bangladesh 1.0 
o. 7 China 10.0 
0.3 Fbnmsa (Taiwan) 13.4* 
0.3 Hong Kong 9.0 
8.5 Irrlia 3.2 
0.7 Irxlonesia 6.0 
8.0 Iraw 1.3 
3.5 Iran 30.0 
0.8 Israel 12.5 
0.2 Japan 269.l* 
00.1 Jordan 0.1 
0.2 Kuwait 1.5 
1.4 Lebanon 0.5 
1.3 Pakistan 4.6 
00. 7 Philippines 0.7 
3.5 Singapore & Malaysia 4.0 
1.0 South Korea 5.0 
60.0 Sri Lanka 0.3 
1.6 Syria 1.2 
0.9 'lllailand 6.5 
1.8 Vietnam 1.5 
4.5 1977 381.4 





*Bases - oo surveys by national associations. 
Source: Inte...rn.ational Aerosol Association, Zuric~. 
See Aerosol~• Vol. 23, No. 12, December 1978, ,:,. ~6. 
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indicates the European usage of CFCs in various product 
categories for 1976 and 1977. 
The European Aerosol Industry 
England, France and Belgium experianced an increase in 
aerosol production in 1977 by 7%, 4% and 5% respectively. West 
Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy experienced 
decreases by 0.1%, 0.2%, 4.0%, and 35.0%, respectively.!/ 
Most countries are finding that hairspray, antiperspirant a~d 
deodorant, and other personal product sales relating to aerosols 
are dropping--slowing growth in overall aerosol use. This drop 
is being offset by increases in sales of insecticides, house-
hold products and other non-personal products.Y The product 
change is significant because it potentially reduces the demand 
for CFCs. The former group of products requires CFCs as a 
propellant almost exclusively, while CFC-use in the latter 
group of products is generally much less and more easily 
substitutable. 
There are several other factors, all very much inter-
connected, that are influencing the use of fluorocarbons in 
aerosols in Europe. The first is current U.S. CFC regulation. 
European industry feels pressure mounting from the U.S. by way 
of the activities of the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
National Resources Defense Council, and other organizations. 
Europe has in the past tended to adopt U.S. regulations in 
various areas, so there appears to be some anxiety over the 
eventual adoption of U.S. rules of CFCs. 
1/ Metra Report, Tables 4.3 and 4.4, pp. 120 and 125. y Ibid. See also Kinglake, "British Production." 
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A second factor is the U.S. aerosol industry. Manufacturers 
of "non-essential" aerosol products appear to have successfully 
converted a variety of products to non-CFC aerosols. The 
consumer has been educated about the lighter weight of the can, 
and product sales have been increasing significantly.lf 
Producers' confidence in these new aerosol products is exhibited, 
for example, by Alberto Culver's switch in its advertising 
emphasis from hair spray pump to hair spray aerosol.!/ An 
additional influence is the availability of U.S. products for 
laboratory analysis. European conversion efforts do not have 
to start with the research phase. 
A third influencing factor is the European Economic 
Com,11u~ity's Commission proposal, specifically Article 2, which 
calls for a 30% reduction in the use of chlorofluorocarbons in 
aerosols in relation to 1976 use levels.Y As accepted by the 
Council of Ministers--a decision was reached in 1980--
i twill go into effect by 31 December 1981. European CFC 
producers and users are carefully monitoring this development. 
Fourth, hydrocarbon propellant producers are strongly 
influencing the aerosol industry. They have traditionally 
been dominated in the market by the CFC producers, who have 
developed a paternalistic attitude toward the aerosol and 
other CFC-related industries. Hydrocarbon producers are 
making a considerable effort to advise fillers on the proper 
conversion and safety needs of their products and facilities, 
3/ Aerosol sales increase. 
!/ San Giovanni, pp. 23-32. 
Y EEC Commission document, 14 May 1979. 
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and on the available grades of hydrocarbon for use in aerosol 
products. Though present U.S. use of hydroe;arbons for 
aerosols only amounts to 1% of the productio1, of propane and 
butane, it is a growing market.Y 
Fifth, because of their desire to maintain the value of 
their investment in the industry, flurocarbon producers have 
not given up their search for a flurocarbon-related aerosol 
propellant. They are still considering FC-22, -142b and -152a, 
all of which contain hydrogen and are therefore likely to 
break down more easily than FC-11 and -12. 
•rhe sixth factor involves economics. Hydrocarbons are 
cheaper than flurocarbons. They do not in themselves have the 
characteristics that make use of fluorocarbons so attractive. 
Yet with the proper formulation, the final product is a good 
sutstitute. Hence there are savings to the consumer and 
savings to the aerosol producer in the use of hydrocarbons. 
The balance of such savings, and their implications for costs, 
prices and profits after considering costs of conversion, is 
not well documented. 
Finally, there are a number of items which may well serve 
to inhibit voluntary conversion to non-fluorocarbon aerosols. 
These include taxes on alcohol, odors in hydrocarbons, and 
safety at the workplace and at the time of nse. Competing 
aerosol producers will not share their product secrets, but 
there has been a considerable effort to educate each other 
on the safety features required in the manufacture and use 
of hydrocarbon propellants. Although there are no regulations 
§_/ See Aerosol Age, "Commentary," p. 5. 
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against the use of hydrocarbons in Europe, they do exist in 
Turkey and undoubtedly in other countries as well. Indeed, 
one American executive expressed a fear of such regulation in 
the U.S. which would add significantly to the costs of conversion. 
These risks must be added to the uncertainty that remaim:: in 
the ozone depletion hypothesis. 
These seven factors have, all or in part, elicited various 
kinds of reactions at the industry level in the European 
countries. Almost without exception, they all feel that the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was entirely too implusive 
about regulation. Yet this has not prevented the British, 
French, Dutch, or German aerosol industries from pursuing 
product changes consistent with those in the U.S. 
British industry representatives voiced their opposition 
to the U.S. CFC regulations quite clearly. Some of this 
re.s,.ction certainly stems from the belief that the ozone-
depletion hypothesis is inherently faulty. Indeed, one 
executive went so far as to say that removing CFCs from the 
stratosphere might deny the CFCs' offsetting properties to 
other chemicals which are thought to play a role in an ozone 
depletion process. There are also two economic factors which 
contribute to the British reluctance to switch aerosol 
formulations. First, British aerosol sales are significantly 
on the rise, particularly exports.I/ Though the relative 
product strengths are changing, and those with only some or no 
CFCs are gaining, the American experience of "all are guilty" 
threatens the present trend of growth. The second is the 
experience of S.C. Johnson Company. In 1976, after the company 
V Kinglake, "British Production." 
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switched to non-CFC aerosol formulations company-wide, its 
market share dropped from 8% to 7% in 1977, a significant 
decline. 
Despite these apparent short-term problems, the British 
feel there are some gains to be made by altering aerosol 
formulations to include hydrocarbons. There is a trade-off 
here--a loss in performance versus the savings from using a 
less expensive propellant. This has facilitated an agreement 
made by industry with the British government to reduce CFC use 
wherever possible. And, the industry is anticipating adoption 
of the EEC program, so that all manufacturers are preparing 
for different formulations.~/ At least one company has begun 
marketing one of its new products in Europe, but outside of 
Britain--it is waiting for consumer acceptance before bringing 
the product back to the U.K., since timing is of critical 
importance to the commercial viability of a new product. 
This effort to change away from CFCs in aerosols is 
dampened by two technical problems: the problem of plQnt 
safety, which is shared by everyone in the aerosol industry, 
and the problem of odors in hydrocarbons. The first has 
already been mentioned. The second, which may be specific 
to Britain alone, stems from a law that requires household-
grade hydrocarbons to be identifiable by smell. In the U.S., 
hydrocarbons for aerosols can be made oderless, or "sweet," by 
scrubbing and repeated molecular sieving. This is not ar. option 
for the British. Consequently, U.K. manufacturers feel that 
perfume products cannot be adequately reformulated without 
~/ Personal interview. 
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fluorocarbons--many would even include all personal products 
in this category. 
The French aerosol industry is in a similar situation to 
the British in terms of sales growth, but the strongest product 
category remains perfumes/colognes. Despite the repeated 
statements that the French woman would never accept inferior 
products--meaning those reformulated with hydrocarbons--it is 
rumored that the largest aerosol producer in France is already 
prepared for reformulation. However the product savings might 
not be comparable with those in Britain, U.S. and other 
countries because of a heavy tax on alcohol which drives up the 
cost of the product. Alcohol is required with hydrocarbon 
propellants to reduce product flammability. 
The German aerosol industry has already undergone a 
substantial change. In 1977 the industry made an agreement 
with the German government to reduce CFC use in aerosols by 
30% from 1975 levels effective 31 December 1979. Because CFC 
use was higher in 1975 than in 1976, the Germans face a 
relatively tougher reduction requirement than that called for 
by the EEC. It is not known how the German industry protects 
itself against the competition from imports containing CFC 
propellants. The reformulated German cans are labeled 
"environmentally friendly," and this may provide enough of a 
competitive edge for products marketed in a socially-minded 
environment. 
In the Netherlands aerosol products containing CFC's are 
labeled with a warning so stating, a regulation effective 
12 
1 April 1979. ReformulatP.d products are being marketed there, 
but the degree of success has not et been measured. The 
situations in Spain and Italy are unpredictable--"politics ar! 
always interfering," one observer noted. But the speculation 
is that there are internal changes being made in the industry 
in preparation for the adoption of the EEC regulation. 
The general conclusion from interviews is that the 
European aerosol industry has already taken a major step 
toward accommodating CFC use-reduction.V How much of this is 
manifest in actual measures and how much as yet shows up only 
in co pany plans is difficult to assess. It may be that a 
majority were waiting for the EEC directive and for new 
scientific findings--another part of the EEC program asks 
for review of the first round of directives in light of new 
scientific evidence.lo/ This would require two costly steps 
toward complete elimination of CFC's in the use of non-
e3sential aerosols. 
The European Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Industry 
Refrigeration and air conditioning in Europe at present 
err,ploys only 11% of R-11 and R-12 production. This number 
is considerably less than that in the U.S. The climate in 
Europe requires far less air conditioning than in the U.S., 
although much of the equipment manufactured in Europe is 
used industrially throughout the world. Refrigeration is of 
course in widespread use in Europe and elsewhere. In Britain 
alone, total 1979 sales and installations by this industry were 
2/ Kinglake, "Toiletries and Cosmetics," pp. 35-36. 
10/ HGrtford, pp. 21-23. 
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valued at h2 billion. Statistics for other countries are not 
available, although they should clearly be comparable for West 
Germany and France, as well as Italy --one of the major producers 
and exporters of household refrigerators. 
The European market is dominated by the affiliates of three 
U.S. companies--Carrier, Trane, York, and the Swiss firm, Sulzer, 
as well as various local suppliers like Bosch, AEG, Siemens, 
etc., that sell both nationally and internationally. However, 
product changes often come through the first four of these 
suppliers. It is interesting to note that while affiliated 
European companies of U.S. firms provide essentially the same 
product, one executive felt that there was greater flexibility 
in his European operations, and that Europe could more easily 
tolerate a system utilizing ammonia than could the U.S. 
In designing refrigeration and air conditioning systems 
for industry, companies are often specifically requested to 
utilize either ammonia or a CFC. One installation in Poland, 
for instance, was build for use with CFC because the customer 
insisted it was easier to operate and required fewer engineers. 
Another executive, however, said that one country in the Middle 
East requested an installation requiring ammonia for the same 
reason. This contradiction is explained by the fact that many 
technical variables and the mix of service conditions will 
determine the ideal choice. 
Although only the U.S. is explicitly considering CFC 
regulation in the air conditioning and refrigeration 
14 
sector, the reprecussions are widely felt due to corporate 
ties especially in Europe. The refrigeration and air 
conditioning industry has always stressed the need to avoid 
CFC leakages--which result in equipment breakdowns. But this 
point has been strongly reiterated in the past few years by an 
industry which is threatend by potential regulation. The EEC 
Council Resolution of 30 May 1978 states that "Immediate steps 
should be taken to encourage the manufacturers and users of 
equipment containing chlorofluorocarbons F-11 and F-12 to 
11/ 
eliminate the discharge of these compounds."-
The British refrigeration industry recently reported to 
their Department of the Environment, as its request, on 
technical improvements and a possible code of practice which 
would reduce or eliminate CFC leakage. The report is classi-
fied, but it apparently estimated that such practice could 
reduce fluorocarbon consumption by 25-30%. One problem now 
seems to be quality control--assembly of parts results in some 
mismatch. An improvement would be to prepack and make one 
manufacturer responsible for all parts of a particular 
assembly. 
There are no other obvious developments in the European 
refrigeration and air conditioning industry in terms of 
reacting to the ozone depletion thesis. The European 
fluorocarbon industry is reportedly researching the use of 
fluorocarbons other than R-11 and R-12 in refrigeration and 
air conditioning equipment. Some conversion was made a few 
yea.rs ago to R-22 and R-502, although these modifications 
11/ EEC Commission document, 14 May 1979. 
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only affect new equipment. These kind of changes, however, 
are viewed as requiring a great deal of time to work through. 
There may be some R&D on the part of the European 
fluorocarbon industry devoted to developing a recycling and 
purification system for CFCs but there was no explicit 
discussion of such among manufacturers. That kind of 
investment is extremely expensive, one executive noted, and 
refused to speculate about future possibilities. He noted 
that technical improvements were the best bet for significant 
emissions reductions in an industry that does not use a great 
quantity of CFCs in the first place. 
The European Polyurethane Foam Industry 
The polyurethane foam sector represents an expanding 
industry in Europe, with flexible foam demand growing at 3% 
12/ a year, and rigid foam demand growing at 8% a year.- The 
markets in Europe are largely based on strength in basic 
construction and automotive demand. Big export markets are 
North America, Japan and Eastern Europe is evidencing a 
growing interest in shoe manufacturing, especially jogging 
shoes. Iran was a large and rapidly growing market until the 
revolution in 1978-79. 
The polyurethane chemical industry is an oligopoly, selling 
to numerous foam manufacturers. The relationship between the 
chemical producers and foam manufacturers is similar to that 
of the fluorocarbon producers and aerosol manufacturers. The 
chemical producers perform an advising function as well as 
12/ Metra Report, pp. XVII-XVIII. 
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development of formulations. The larger polyurethane chemical 
producers in Europe are BASF, Bayer, ICI, Montedison and Upjohn, 
with a smaller input from DuPont, RhOnePoulenc and Shell. 
There are four factors influencing change in the 
polyurethane foam industry. The first factor is U.S. 
fluorocarbon regulations. This has been the only source of 
particular pressure on urethane products resulting from the 
fluorocarbon-ozone controversy. However, aerosol foam 
systems in Sweden were also threatened by the Swedish regulation 
banning CFCs in non-essential aerosols, although it is thought 
that the final Swedish assessment released these systems from 
regulation. 
Another factor is the proposed second phase of U.S. 
fluorocarbon regulations, which includes foam products in its 
domain. The possible content of this development is not yet 
fully known, but the European polyurethane industry is 
aware of and concerned with the possibility of further 
regulatory moves in the U.S. 
The third factor is the EEC Council Resolution of 30 May 
1978, which stated that "Immediate steps should be taken to 
encourage all the aerosol and plastic foam industries using 
chlorofluorocarbons F-11 (CC13F) and F-12 (CC12F) to 
intensify research into alternative products and to promote 
the development of alternative methods of application. 11131 
A fourth consideration is Dow Chemical Corporation and 
other firms that market methylene chloride, a close substitute 
for F-11 in flexible foam manufacture. There was some 
13/ EEC Commission document, 14 May 1979. 
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question about the toxicity of methylene chloride, a question 
which Dow promptly investigated. Although Dow gave it a clean 
bill of health, there is at least in Germany a toxicity 
limiting value (TLV) of 100 ppm because methylene chloride 
metabolizes to carbon monoxide. 14/ 
The changes that have occurred in the European foam 
industry are not yet visible in terms of a changed product. 
Price, employment and production have not yet been affected. 
There is change, however, in R&D expenditures. Companies are 
actively looking for alternative formulations. Executives 
state that flexible foam will be made less soft if CFC's are 
used more sparingly and more water is used, but they concede 
that the product would eventually be accepted by the market. 
Rigid foam, however, cannot at present be manufactured any 
other way, and to remove CFCs from the formulation is to kill 
a product vital to energy conservation. 
Proposals have been made to cut fluorocarbons released 
during flexible foam manufacture, but R&D emphasis has not 
been given to this issue as yet. Recycling might be considered 
in the longer term but the process at present is uneconomical. 
In addition, the amount of air required to vent Manufacturing 
areas makes the fluorocarbon-air mixture so dilute that 
recapturing fluorocarbons is close to a technical 
. 'b'l' 15/ impossi i ity.-
European executives, in anticipating regulation of 
flexible foam in the U.S. and the possibility of subsequent 
14/ Personal interview. 
15/ Personal interview. 
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regulation in Europe, are concerned with harmonization of laws 
in order to avert massive reorganization in competitive 
structures. Since regulation would be on production rather 
than consumption, foreign manufacturers could market in areas 
where manufacturing is banned. Harmonization of policies in 
this area throughout the EEC is viewed as a necessity. 
The European Auto Air Conditioning Sector 
The automobile air conditioning industry in Europe is quite 
small. Its largest markets are outside Europe. 161 Only 10% to 
15% of the cars in Europe are equipped with air conditioning 
units, whereas in the U.S. the percentage is around 80. One 
interviewee foresees air conditioning use eventually reaching 
25%, but not anytime soon since it is used on the larger, 
more expensive cars which also use more fuel and are not 
likely to be in great demand in the foreseeable future. The 
auto air conditioning market is supplied by Behr of Germany, 
Sofica of France and Ipra of Italy, and there are units 
supplied by various U.S. companies. The market is in large 
part split between Behr and Sofica. 
The auto air conditioning firms do not seem to have been 
influenced by the ongoing fluorocarbon-ozone controversy. 17 / 
Indeed, one interviewee was quite perplexed as to why he 
was being included in the study. His view was that, if there 
were any changes to be made, they would probably come from 
the fluorocarbon suppliers themselves. 
16/ Personal interview. 
17/ Personal interview. 
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Summary 
Our assessment of European reactions to U.S. CFC policy 
revealed that there are major changes occurring in the European 
aerosol industry, while there are more subtle movements, if any, 
in the air conditioning and refrigeration, polyurethane, and 
automotive air conditioning sectors. The European aerosol 
producers have, for the most part, prepared reformulations of 
products reducing the amount of, or eliminating, CFC propellants 
per unit in light of anticipated EEC regulatory directives 
and in response to perceived economic advantages. These 
products have appeared in West Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium. Their appearance in the remaining European countries 
depends on the resolution of uncertainties in the ozone 
depletion theory, in the passing of the EEC regulation directive, 
and in determining the strength of market share for a new product. 
Product change or adaptation has not occurred in the other 
three CFC related industries. The air conditioning and 
refrigeration, and the polyurethane industries are each devoting 
additional R&D efforts to technical improvements and alternative 
refrigerants, in the first case, and to alternative blowing 
agents and reformulation in the second case. Representatives 
of the air conditioning and refrigeration industry foresee 
substantial savings in CFC use coming from these technical 
improvements and from the institution of a code of practice 
which would charge one manufacturer with the production of 
entire assemblies. The polyurethane industry representatives 
could accommodate the reducation, and possibly elimination of 
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CFCs in their flexible foams, but only if there were to be 
identical requirements, at the least, throughout Europe and the 
U.S. Changes in the formulation for rigid foams would 
obliterate this product's advantage, and, therefore, its market. 
Hence, producers are firm in their request for its release from 
regulation. The automotive air conditioning industry has felt 
no impact from either U.S. CFC policy or the ozone controversy 
as a whole as yet. 
Shared Ozone Management 
We have now discussed, in some detail, the degree to which 
ozone management policies in major CFC source countries differs 
from that in the U.S., and the way these differences are likely 
to unfold in the years ahead. Our conclusion is that there is 
a problem, stemming from differences in perceptions of 
scientific evidence, damage functions, costs of control, and 
attitudes toward risk. Whereas these differences are perhaps 
not as strong as they once were, particularly with recent 
initiatives in the EEC, there remains a significant problem of 
international coordination to be resolved. The second part of 
this paper develops the nature of options from unilateral and 
multilateral initiatives--concentrating particularly on 
constraints facing unilateral measures. 
The stratospheric ozone layer clearly represents an 
international common property resource--a natural asset 
providing man with an indivisible and valuable flow of 
services. Because no one can control access to the flow of 
services, and any individual can feasibly take advantage of 
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them, the ozone layer cannot be reduced to private ownership 
and effectively exchanged in markets. As with other common 
property resources, open and complete access to the services 
of stratosphere ozone appears to be leading to overuse, misuse 
and quality degradation. The ozone layer is, the addition, a 
public or collective good--its stream of services can be used 
by one person without diminishing its availability to another. 
Its improvement or depletion affects everyone. The outcomes of 
management efforts to protect it from CFC-induced degradation 
also represent public goods. As such, we can perceive that a 
"free rider" problem exists--nations may see few incentives to 
contribute to a CFC abatement effort given that they can have 
free access to the benefits other nations generate by their 
abatement actions. Incentives exists for countries to falsely 
report their benefits and costs in order to profit from the 
actions of others. 
International action aimed at the ozone problem is 
obviously desirable to avert a possible "tragedy of the commons" 
given that CFCs are used worldwide, that stratospheric CFC 
pollution does not recognize national boundaries, and that any 
depletion of the ozone layer is expected to impose damages 
around the globe. For idealists, the only answer to this kind 
of problem is to create a sort of international environmental 
protection agency that would design and apply worldwide 
international controls. But in a world where national 
sovereignty is still jealously guarded, the call for a global 
EPA remains a uto?ian, impractical notion. And so the ozone 
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management problem can be solved only through voluntary 
behavior on the part of CFC producing and/or consuming nations--
realistically, complusion is simply not possible. 
Here we shall attempt to add to the insights already 
provided by our survey by theoretical approaches. We shall 
first examine the ozone depletion problem from the point of 
view of some simple theory, and then develop a framework for 
assessing the probable success of an effort aimed at bringing 
about a coordinated international approach. 
An Elementary Model 
A simple model, adapted from the work of Charles Pearson 
on ocean management, can be used to suggest some principles 
for the shared management of stratospheric ozone. 181 The 
model highlights problems in negotiation of international 
controls in the absence of a supranational authority, the 
inherent linkage between concerns of allocative efficiency and 
distributional consequences in dealing with international 
common property resources, and the apparent need for 
international transfer payments (i.e., bribes) between nations 
in order to obtain optimal agreements. The basic question 
addressed is whether globally optimal reductions in CFC 
emission levels can be approximated via independent, 
parochical national abatement efforts. Assume for simplicity 
the following: 
1. A world composed of two actors: the United States (us) 
and the rest of the world (rw). Each pollute the commonly 
shared ozone layer, using if for CFC waste disposal services. 
18/ See Pearson, in Walter (ed.), 1976. see also 
Pearson and Pryor. 
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2. Each actor contributes an identical amount of CFC emissions 
(such was approximately the case prior to U.S. action on 
nonessential aerosols). 
3. Marginal damages from CFC emissions are constant. 
4. CFC emissions once rising to the stratosphere cause 
identical damages, regardless of whether they emanate from 
the United States or the rest of the world. 
5. Marginal costs for CFC abatement are independent and 
rising. 
6. Marginal costs of CFC abatement are higher in the rest of 
the world than in the U.S. (reflectina, for example, 
greater difficulties in finding alternative 
propellant and refrigeration technologies, and the like). 
7. Marginal benefits from CFC abatement are idependent and 
constant (this is the implication of assumed constant 
marginal damage from CFC emissions). 
8. Marginal damage (i.e., abatement benefit) from CFC 
emissions is at a higher level of the United States than 
for the rest of the world (as a consequence, for example, 
of skin pigmentation, altitude, latitude, agricultural 
production, and risk-cost perceptions). 
9. Neither actor, in the absence of compulsion, will 
undertake CFC abatement beyond the point where it is 
made worse off by doing so. 
This situation is depicted in Exhibit 2. The horizontal 
axis measures CFC emissions abatement by both actors. At 
100%, therefore, neither party is depleting stratospheric 
ozone. The vertical axis measures marginal costs (MC) and 
marginal benefits (MB). Marginal costs of CFC abatement are 
MC for the United States and MC for the rest of the world. us rw 
The constant marginal benefits from CFC abatement are 
indicated by MBus for the United States and MBrw for the rest 
of the world. 
The global marginal costs of CFC abatement--assuming that 
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Adapted from Pearson and Prior. 
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allocated between the United States and the rest of the world--
is the horizontal sum of MCrw and MCus' or MCrw + us· This 
represents the minimum global marginal CFC abatement cost 
curve. Leaving aside the distributional consequences for the 
two parties, Exhibit 2 shows that the incremental real 
resource costs of CFC abatement will be equal to the incremental 
damages avoided only at level Q0 • To achieve that level the 
rest of the world would undertake CFC emissions reduction at 
the level Q;w' while the United States would undertake 
abatement at the level Q~s· At Q0 resources would be allocated 
in an optimal fashion from a global perspective. Dual 
optimality criteria would exist: MCrw + us would equal 
MBrw + us and marginal CFC abatement costs from all emitting 
sources would be equalized, that is, MCrw would equal MCus· 
Exhibit 2 provides various insights regarding potential 
international regotiations over CFC emission reductions. If 
no CFC abatement were undertaken by either party, for example, 
the United States (under our assumptions) would suffer greater 
total damages than the rest of the world (OBB'A" is greater 
than QAA'A"). Even though both would be contributing equal 
quantities of CFC emissions, the United States because of its 
damage assessment would suffer a greater welfare loss. 
Another point is that unilateral action, taken 
independently and from a purely national perspective (i.e., 
exclusively a function of local CFC abatement cost and damage 
functions), could improve each party's welfare. Unilateral 
action, however, would result in suboptimal CFC abatement from 
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a global perspective. The reason is that the rest of the world 
would equate its marginal costs and benefits (MCrw = MBrw) and 
pursue an abatement level Qrw· The United States would 
similarly choose MCus = MBus or abatement level Qus· As 
shown, the sum of the unilateral CFC abatement efforts 
(OQrw and OQus) would add to less than the optimal OQ0 • This 
simply reflects the essential character of externalities imposed 
on international common property resources--national decisions 
to undertake CFC abatement, in the absence of complusion, would 
not take into account incidental damage caused to other nations. 
It follows that the prospects that an international 
agreement among the parties on reducing CFC emissions will 
select the globally optimum CFC abatement level (Q0 ) are poor 
unless compensatory payments can be made between the parties. 
The globally optimal CFC abatement level, under our assumptions, 
would require a greater relative and absolute CFC abatement 
effort by the United States than the rest of the world (Q~s is 
greater than Q~w). If the outcome of negotiations is a 
requirement of equal CFC abatement, the optimal level Q0 
would be reached in each party undertook QP. But at Qp the 
marginal cost for the rest of the world exceeds the marginal 
cost for the United States, and the allocation of CFC 
abatement effort would therefore be inefficient. The 
implication for global CFC policy is as follows: If CFC 
abatement cost and damage functions differ markedly from 
nation to nation, then optimal environmental policy for 
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managing the shared ozone layer will generally require 
disproportionate cost burdens. Countries having relatively 
low-cost alternatives (and/or greater damage or benefit 
perceptions) would need to undertake greater CFC abatement in 
order to approach the globally optimum abatement level. One 
can easily predict resistance on equity grounds, especially 
if no compensatory payments could be made. 
But another feature in our example should be noted. If the 
optimum global level of CFC abatement were chosen, both the 
United States and the rest of the world could be better off 
than if there were no CFC abatement. The global optimum is 
thus not ruled out. This can be seen in Exhibit 2 comparing 
the area under the marginal benefit curves for the rest of 
the world and the United States. Net benefits for the United 
States would be OBDQ0 less OFQ~s· The rest of the world would 
receive net benefits equal to OACQ0 less OEQ;w--that is,gross 
benefits less CFC abatement costs. 
What conclusions can be drawn from this simple conceptual 
analysis? One is that unilateral action by CFC producing and 
consuming nations to reduce CFC emissions based on their narrow 
cost-benefit calculus will go some distance toward protection 
the stratospheric ozone layer--but the abatement level achieved 
is likely to be suboptimal from a global perspective. The 
chances of the optimum being attained will be greate4 the more 
local the damages caused by ozone depletion, that is, the 
smaller the external costs passed among nations. In any case, 
the United States should be able to encourage other nations to 
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take protective measures of stratospheric ozone by showing that 
those efforts are in their own self-interest. The key will 
rest in influencing the substance and process of cost-benefit 
analysis in those nations. In terms of our analysis, 
efforts should be directed at raising perceived marginal 
benefit (damage) functions and lowering perceived marginal 
cost functions. 
As we have already noted, in the absence of a supranational 
authority that could compel compliance, a reasonable working. 
assumption is that nations will voluntarily join an agreement 
to limit CFC emissions only if they are made no worse off by 
so doing. Our model implies, however, that a voluntary 
agreement among nations to limit CFC-induced ozone depletion 
could possibly encourage each to go beyond its parochially 
determined abatement levels. This is because the potential 
for each being made better off may exist. There may be 
benefits associated with joint reduction efforts, therefore, 
which can be used to motivate nations into going further in 
CP~ abatement than if they were left alone. This, once again, 
simply reflects the common property/public good nature of the 
ozone layer--nations benefit themselves as well as others when 
abatement efforts are undertaken. 
Attaining the true, global optimal CFC abatement level, 
however, will probably require use of some international 
compensatory system. Those nations with lower marginal 
abaten,ent costs (in our example, the United States) may find 
it necessary to compensate those nations confronting higher 
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mnrginal costs (or perceiving lower marginal benefits), in 
return for those nations undertaking abatement efforts beyond 
those called for in purely local optimization terms. If no 
compensation payments--side deals such as trade concessions, 
foreign aid, troop levels and the like--can be made, or if the 
only "currency" for making payments is in units of CFC 
abatement, it is unlikely that the globally optimum level of 
CFC abatement will be attained. The rationale for compensation 
paid by the "victim" (the United States in our example) is 
simple--as long as the amount of the bribe needed to induce 
the other nations to reduce CFC emissions is less than the 
damage inflicted on the bribing nation, then that nation will 
be better off by paying the bribe. More in the way of 
compensation payments may be necessary as a result of the 
unilateral action of the United States banning CFC use in 
nonessential aerosols. The argument can be made that the 
United States gave away units of CFC abatement in return for 
very few concessions by other producing nations. With fewer 
and only terribly more expensive units of CFC abatement 
available to trade, the United States may have to turn to 
other forms of compensation. 
Applications of Shared Management Principles 
Stratospheric ozone is not the first international common 
property resource problem confronted by the world's nations. 
Useful lessons for U.S. ozone policy, therefore, can be drawn 
from examining previous experience with attempts at managing 
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shared natural resources (oceans, lakes, rivers, fisheries, 
airsheds, and the like). An extensive review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature concerning these efforts 
at shared resource management indicates many factors or 
conditions bearing on the likelihood of successful 
international cooperation. 191 Exhibit 3 provides a listing 
of these factors and also suggests the attributes of each which 
have generally been found to either facilitate or impede the 
process of developing international agreement and coordination 
regarding constructive management of a shared common property 
resource. The factors are classified into four interrelated 
categories: characteristics of the environmental or resource 
problem at stake, the parties (nations) involved, the problem-
solving capabilities available, and the wider negotiating 
context in existence. 
Exhibit 3 can be interpreted in a probabilistic fashion. 
Examine, for example, the nine characteristics associated with 
the type of environmental problem at stake (Section A). Some 
kinds of international environmental problems are more likely 
to motivate or facilitate joint management action among nations 
than others. Successful cooperation, according to our 
literature review, appears most likely when transfrontier 
pollution damages are reciprocal, when scientific consensus 
has been achieved internationally, when the underlying theory 
(e.g., chemical, physical, biological) and associated risks 
involved are relatively certain, and when the problem is 
19/ Among others, see Barros and Johnston, Caldwell, 
Hargrove, Kay and Skolnifokk, and Young. 
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Exhibit 3 
Factors Bearing Upon Successful Joing Managerrent of a 
Shared International camon Property Resource 
Attributes which terx:I to: 
Factor 
A. Characteristics of Enviromental 
Problem at Stake: 
l. Transfrontier pollution flow 
2. International scientific consensus 
3. uncertainty of underlying theory 
4. Uncertainty of associated risks 
5. Problem urgency 
6. Problem scale/scope 
7. Problem gravity/severity 
8. Problem clarity 
9. Problem reversibility 
B. Characteristics of Parties (Nations) 
Involved: 
l. Number of parties 
2. Perceived damage functions 
3. Perceived abaterrent cost functions 
4. Risk-cost tradeoffs 
5. Desires for national sovereignty 
6. Business...,;overment relations 
7. Enviromental political pressures 
8. Technologies eirployed 
9. Econcrnic develoµrent levels 
c. Characteristics of Problem-Solving 
capabilities Available: 
l. Supranational enforcerrent autoority 

























3. International organization involverent strong 
4. International scientific involvement strong 
5. Financial resources available abundant 
6. Availability of alternative techno-
logies available 
7. Solution caiplexity/difficulty easy 
8. Econcrnic costs of solution low 

































Exhibit 3 continued 
Factor 
D. Characteristics of Negotiating Context 
in Existence: 
1. Nmi:ler of issues 
2. Vol1.111e of transnational relations 
3. Availability of precedents 
4. International legal foundations 
5. Precedent setting 
6. International payirents neoork 
7. Transactions costs 
8. Third party pressure 
9. Dispute resolution machinery 
10. Quality of diplanatic relations 
11. Kim of firms involved 
12. F.quity vs. efficiency balaoce 
13. Reversibility of regulatory action 





































Profile of Factors Bearing Upon Developnent of International Cooperation in Controlling C,, 
Emissions 
(X = status as of October 1979) 
(+ or -+- = direction of n-overrent expected during 1980-81) 
((X) = oo si · ficant ) 
a .§ .... 
6 .... .... a ~i ~i >,,.., >,-.;:1 ........ m !i 
.... ,a 
!I Factors ~2 [2 .9 .5 .9 .5 
>,· ... >,,.., 
11 ll .... .... .... .... fEl ~] . ,a .... 
A. Characteristics of Envirom-ental Prolems 
at Stake: 
1. Transfrontier pollution flow X 
2. International scientific consensus X 
3. Uncertainty of underlying the:>ry X 
4. Uncertainty of associated risks X 
5. Problem urgency (X) 
6. Problem scale/scope (X) 
7. Problem gravity/severity (X) 
8. Provlem clarity X 
9. Problen reversibility (X) 
B. Characteristics of Parties (Nations) 
Involved: 
1. Nuroer of parties X 
2. Perceived damage fwlctions X 
3. Perceived abatement cost functions X 
4. Risk-cost tradeoffs X 
5. Desires for national soverignty (X) 
6. Business government relations (X) 
7. Envirom-ental political pressures X 
8. Technologies erployed (X) 
9. F.cor¥:lnic developient levels (X) 
c. Characteristics of Problem-Solvin9: 
CaE!!:!ilitles Available: 
1. Supranational enforcement authority (X) 
2. Quality of experts involved (X) 
3. International organization involvement X 
4. International scientific involvarent X 
5. Financial resources available (X) 
6. Availability of alternative techoo-
logies X 
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Exhibit 4 continued 
§ . .., § . .., 
.µ .µ u d § >, § >,-.., ...... .., ..... .µ .µ .µ !I m <ti ~11. B~ B~ B § 
>,-.., >,-.., >, QJ 
ii .......... ..... ..... iJ QJ-.., QJ•.., j~ ...: CJ ·j~ ·j. 
7. Solution carplexity/difficulty (X) 
a. F.conanic costs of solution (X) 
9. Leadership role assi.med (X) 
D. Characteristics of N~otiatin9: Context 
in Existence: 
1. Numl:;er of issues X 
2. Volurre of transnational relations (X) 
3. Availability of precedents (X) 
4. Intemational legal foundations (X) 
5. Precedent setting X 
6. International payirents net:lo.Ork (X) 
7. Transactions costs X 
a. Third party pressure (X) 
9. Dispute resolution i:ra.chinery (X) 
10. Quality of diplaratic relations (X) 
11. Kind of finns involved (X) 
12. Equity vs. efficiency balance X 
13. Reversibility of regulatory action X 
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brackets around some of the X's indicate that no significant 
movement in either direction is expected. A summary of the 
logic employed in reaching these points and trends judgements 
follows. 
Characteristics of the CFC problem. The ozone depletion 
problem is currently marked by a range of features which 
probably makes international cooperation difficult to achieve. 
One critical factor working in favor of cooperation, however, is 
the mutuality of the CFC emissions damage flows--"reciprocal 
transfrontier pollution is in some ways as easier problem to 
solve than simple one-way transfrontier pollution. The reason 
is, of course, that the polluting country itself feels the 
direct consequences of its own action, which diminishes the 
cost-benefit gap between it and the victim country with respect 
to the pollution-control process. There is at least partial 
coincidence of both rights and damages. As a result, the 
bargaining conflicts are less, and the likelihood of compromise 
1 . . d. 1 " 20/ h so utions is correspon ing y greater. - We must note, owever, 
that the United States--via its frontrunner unilateral actions 
in banning CFC use in nonessential aerosols--has greatly 
reduced its contribution of global CFC emissions (from a share 
of about one-half down to about one-fourth). 
Despite the fact that damages are still reciprocal (but 
less so now than a few years ago), most other features of the 
ozone-depletion problem appear biased against collaborative 
international CFC controls. Although there is growing 
20/ See Walter, 1975. 
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scientific agreement (more so in the United States than over-
seas) that CFCs do deplete stratospheric ozone, there is still 
sharp disagreement over the rate of depletion and whether it 
is rapid enough towarrant further restrictions. The degree 
of international scientific acceptance of the full ozone-
depletion theory and its consequences will fundamentally affect 
the pace at which control measures are adopted. But proof of 
the theory and an accurate pinpointing of the depletion rate 
are years away, and no near-term results are likely to settle 
the uncertainties of the ozone-depletion hypothesis. In 
addition, many doubts still exist about the risks of continued 
CFC use. The risk of skin cancer in humans, possible damage to 
crops and wildlife, and particularly long term changes in 
climate, all continue to be widely debated--for some, the risks 
are reason for hysteria; for others, they are trivial. These 
uncertainties in large measure explain the staunch wait-and-see 
attitude of various foreign governments (e.g., Britain, France). 
Research programs currently underway, however, may help to 
reduce these uncertainties over the next years, at least in 
part, and thereby facilitate the formation of international 
scientific consensus. 
Still other features of the problem appear biased against 
quick and cooperative international action. One is a divergence 
of opinion regarding the urgency of the ozone-depletion problem. 
No immediate hazard to life is at stake and adverse effects 
predicted to appear thirty to fifty years from now are 
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heavily discounted. The problem is also global in its 
dimensions, on a scale that is very difficult to solve. And 
even given the worst possible interpretation of the ozone 
threat, such as eventual losses of up to 20% of the 
stratosphere's ozone, some experts have concluded that the 
adverse effects (e.g., in the form of incremental cases of 
skin cancer per 100,000 light-skinned population living at 
high altitudes) would be relatively minor. Still other 
scientists claim that anthropogenic generation of prodigious 
amounts of co2 is both speeding up the generation of 
stratospheric ozone and slowing down those reactions which 
may act to deplete it. The implication is that the insertion 
of CFCs into the environment may perhpas be beneficial in 
helping to limit the degree of eventual ozone proliferation. 
In any case, the nature of the total ozone layer problem is 
still unclear, particularly with respect to combined or 
synergistic effects of atmospheric pollutants--more research 
may help to reduce these uncertainties in the years ahead. 
Finally, not all are convinced that we are dealing with a 
problem which nature cannot correct. In some quarters the 
view is emerging that the ozone layer is a durable, rugged 
system that possesses a remarkable ability to recover from 
perturbations and restore the untraviolet shield. In sum, 
current perceptions of the CFC-ozone depletion problem appear 
heavily biased against the development of international 
consensus and synchronous or tandem emissions control action. 
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Progress hinges critically on the reduction of many types of 
. 'f' . 21/ scienti ic uncertainty.-
Characteristics of the parties involved. Many 
characteristics of the nations involved in CFC production and 
consumption also militate against effective international 
action. Perhaps the two most negative factors are the large 
number of "relevant" countries involved and deeply imbedded 
notions of "national sovereignty." The large number of 
parties involved translates into difficult communication, 
coordination and implementation problems on goals and means 
of CFC control. Involvement of relatively disinterested or 
"coerced" parties would tend to reduce outcomes to the "lowest 
common denominator." For this reason, it may be wise to seek 
coordinated action only on the part of the primary producer 
nations--substantial improvements could result even in the 
absence of countries such as the Soviet Union, India, 
Argentina, South Africa, or those of Eastern Europe. But 
even among the OECD nations, most will remain unwilling to 
give up their freedom of action in favor of international 
constraints. 
If the communist and developing nations are set aside, 
then problems associated with different types of technology 
and levels of economic development should not represent major 
stumbling blocks in achieving international cooperation. 
Most of the OECD nations involved should be able to more or 
less equally bear the costs of reducing CFC emissions. But 
21/ See Fox. 
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a range of other variations among the primary producer nations 
may constrain development of a cooperative approach. Even if 
the objective uncertainties regarding the CFC-ozone depletion 
are reduced, subjective assessments of the risks and costs 
involved would surely continue to differ among nations. Most 
societies are less risk-averse than the United States--few are 
willing to go as far in implementing policy using the "better-
safe-than-sorry" philosophy. On both objective and subjective 
grounds, perceived damage and abatement cost functions are 
likely to remain varied among the producing nations involved. 
Convergence will depend on the attainment of better 
scientific understanding and consensus internationally. 
We should also note that the power of CFC industries and 
environmental lobbies to influence the shape of government 
policy of CFCs varies among nations. The industry point 
of view is generally given greater weight on environmental 
questions in countries such as France, the United Kingdon, 
Italy and Japan than in the United States. And environmental 
groups which in the United States have helped to keep the 
ozone depletion issue in the public spotlight, are generally 
much less powerful in most other CFC producing nations. 
Furthermore, within most environmental group communities 
overseas, the ozone-depletion issue has not rated as high a 
priority as in the United States. The issue has also not 
received the equivalent amount of attention from the press. 
Indigenous political pressures for CFC control, in fact, have 
yet to devleop at all in sone of the nations involved. 
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Characteristics of the available problem-solving 
capabilities. Of the four categories of factors profiled 
in Exhibit 4, the brighest outlook for international 
cooperation appears to rest with the problem-solving 
capabilities available. The CFC-ozone depletion problem 
has attracted high quality scientific expertise (particularly 
in the U.S.) and financial resources for atmospheric research 
and economic evaluation have been abundant. International 
organizations such as OECD and various bodies of the United 
Nations have become involved (perhaps thus far not to the 
extent necessary) and a leadership role has been assumed by 
the United States. Leadership, of course, entails both 
benefits and risks. The U.S., by bringing the issue to the 
world's attention and in initiating remedial action by banning 
nonessential uses of CFCs, has hopefully set the stage for a 
powerful "demonstration effect." The road ahead has been 
paved. With time and careful diplomacy, others will hopefully 
follow. Coercive pressure tactics to induce the "bandwagon," 
however--given the uncertainties and national viewpoints 
reviewed about--could easily backfire. 
On the negative side, the foremost obstacles to 
international cooperation in this capability sector relate 
to the difficulty, complexity and feasibility of technological 
solutions. Finding substitutes for CFC use in aerosols, of 
course, has proved to be quite feasible and rather painless. 
The real problems center on the availability of substitutes 
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for nonaerosol CFC applications--ready substitutes have 
reportedly not yet been found for CFCs as refrigerants and 
foaming, cleaning and fire extinguishing agents. Much 
resistance can be expected unless and until the technology 
for replacing CFCs develops further (which may indeed occur 
over the next few years). Until then, the perceived economic 
costs of CFC controls will remain high--aggregate abatement 
costs will naturally be highest in large CFC producing and 
using nations such as the United States, West Germany and 
the United Kingdom. 
Although certain segments of the foreign scientific 
community have exhibited considerable interest in the CFC-
ozone-depletion problem, still deeper and more widespread 
involvement is necessary. The reason is that international 
scientific consensus is not likely to develop rapidly unless 
such expanded involvement is attained. No supranational 
a~thority having the power to compel compliance currently 
exists, and none is likely to emerge soon. Without such 
complusion, international cooperation can be obtained only 
through voluntary means. Local scientific support for CFC 
control measures would seem to represent a necessary 
condition for such voluntary behavior to come about. 
Characteristics of the negotiating context. The 
broader context surrounding international negotiations over 
CFC emissions consists of an assortment of institutional 
factors bearing upon bargaining incentives and processes. 
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In general, that context currently appears to be midly 
unfavorable. We do see, however, a large volume of trans-
national relations among the OCED CFC-producing member 
countries. Flows of influence and communications are multi-
farious. Economic, political, military, and cultural ties are 
close and diplomatic relations are generally of a high quality. 
)3argaining is thus among "friends" (assuming Communist and 
developing nations are not involved). Another potentially 
favorable factor is that some CFC-related industries involve 
multinational companies. Flows of technology, information 
and policy from the U.S. or European parents to their foreign 
affiliates in regard to CFC substitues may represent an 
important mechanism for bringing about CFC emissions reductions 
overseas. Home-country governments may be able to shape the 
incentives guiding mangers at the headquarters level of these 
firms such that global emission reduction policies are adopted. 
In certain cases, of course, the involvement of multinationals 
in the CFC problem may inhibit cooperation among governments, 
particularly if the firms choose or threaten to escape to 
"CFC pollution havens." Such behavior may not occur, however, 
given that the CFC emissions issue is mainly a consumption 
rather than production related environmental problem--what 
good would it do to switch production of CFCs or CFC-using 
goods to a "pollution haven" if the flow of such goods into 
major markets could easily be stopped via import barriers. 
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The basic institutional problem is the fact that 
international efforts to manage common property resources is 
a rather new endeavor on the world scene. Few tried and 
tested precedents are available, experience with large scale 
international negotiations is sparse, international law in 
the area is quite embryonic and not definitive, impartial 
dispute resolution machinery for such issues does not yet 
exist, third party roles and pressures are undeveloped, and 
perhaps most importantly, international compensation networks 
are highly imperfect. We saw earlier that prospects for 
optimal or adequate international environmental safeguards 
may critically depend on flows of compensation between victims 
and polluters. More efficient mechanisms for such 
international transfers remain to be developed. 
The number of issues at stake in the CFC-ozone-depletion 
problem, and the transactions costs entailed in the bargaining 
process, are likely to decline over time as uncertainties are 
reduced and experience with negotiations develops. But other 
factors may still serve to impede progress. Regulators in some 
nations may grow increasingly concerned about the risks 
involved in taking actions that "wipe out an industry" and 
are thus perceived as irreversible. Bargaining has the chance 
of becoming highly politicized, that is, becoming obsessed with 
emotional equity rather than hard-headed efficiency issues. 
And finally, great caution may emerge if the nations involved 
come to see the CFC issue as a pathbreaking, precedent-setting 
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matter that would set the ground rules for other common 
property resource problems. Such a view would raise the 
stakes involved. 
Summary of characteristics. The outlook for successful 
international cooperation in reducing CFC-emissions, in our 
view, has not been very bright. But with patience and 
diplomacy, the chances for success may significantly improve. 
The key barriers currently lie with the inherent nature of the 
CFC-ozone-depletion problem and with the nature of the parties 
involved. Problem-solving capabilities, on the other hand, 
appear adequate to the task. And the institutional context 
surrounding international bargaining, while at the moment 
highly imperfect and full of impediments, can with skillful, 
sincere and creative diplomacy probably be overcome. 
Toward International Coordination 
Given the foregoing discusssion, what concrete actions 
are available to the U.S. to deal with the global ozone 
management problem. A potentially useful way to orangize a 
national strategy is presented in Exhibit 5. This is a 
conflict management model that has been successfully applied 
to a variety of disputes that fall outside the confines of 
the marketplace.~/ 
When one party is in a conflict with one or more others, 
its behavior can be defined in terms of two dimensions, 
assertiveness and cooperativeness. Observed conflict behavior 
is a product of these two dimensions. A protagonist can 
choose to try to dominate the other party in a purely 
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competitive effort (assertive/uncooperative). It can leave 
the field and avoid the conflict entirely (unassertive/un-
cooperative). Alternatively, it can accommodate or appease 
the other side (unassertive/cooperative). Or it can choose 
to work fully with the opposition in a collaborative effort 
to achieve a solution (assertive/cooperative). Compromise, 
involving moderately assertive and/or cooperative behavior, 
may also be appropriate under certain circumstances. Of 
course, opponents in any given conflict may be fractionated, 
with different behavior applied to each, or treated in 
different ways at different ways at different points in time 
via sequential applications of conflict management strategies. 
What determines how assertive or cooperative conflict 
management strategy ought to be? Assertiveness is determined 
by the protagonist's stakes in the outcome of the conflict, 
modified by its power to influence outcome of the conflict 
relative to the power position of the other side. High 
stakes and power tend to produce assertive behavior, for 
example, while low stakes and/or low power tend to suggest 
avoidance. Cooperativeness is determined by the degree of 
interest interdependence (zero-sumness) inherent in a conflict 
and the relationship quality that exists between the 
protagonists. A zero-sum game with poor relationship 
quality, for example, would tend to bias conflict behavior 
toward non-cooperation, while a positive-sum game in which 
both sides can gain, coupled to a favorable relationship 
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quality, would tend to produce cooperative behavior. In the 
former case the outcome is likely to be competitive or 
avoidance-oriented behavior, while in the latter case 
appeasement or collaboration are much more likely to result. 
How can this general non-market conflict management 
model be applied to the case of CFCs? What does the model 
suggest, in the light of the empirical and conceptual 
discussion we have presented in this paper, about an optimal 
strategy for the United States? 
Outcome stakes. For the United States, the outcome 
stakes in the ozone depletion issue would appear to be 
relatively high. The prospective damage assessments are 
perhaps more serious in the U.S. than elsewhere, the theory 
of ozone depletion is perhaps more widely accepted even in 
the absence of hard evidence, and the general aversion to 
risk seems considerably higher in the U.S. than in much of 
the rest of the world. The stakes are raised further by 
the enormous costs of moving beyond non-essential aerosols 
into cutbacks of other CFC uses as refrigerants and foam 
blowing agents. This would suggest a relative assertive 
international stance on the CFC issue. 
Relative power. The relative power of the United 
States with respect to CFCs themselves has been eroded, as 
we have repeatedly pointed out, by the unilateral action to 
ban non-essential uses of CFCs in aerosols in 1979. 
Nonetheless, a partially compensatory gain may have achieved 
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by virtue of the "demonstration effect" of U.S. leadership on 
a highly controversial issue. Moreover, the U.S. remains the 
single largest national market in the world, access to which 
makes a great deal of difference elsewhere. Whereas the U.S. 
no longer calls the shots in world trade, which bounds the 
pressure tactics it can successfully apply, it remains 
sufficiently powerful economically to exert considerable 
influence particularly in areas where stakes are not viewed 
as highly abroad. 
Interest interdependence. The protection of the ozone 
shield is clearly a positive-sum game. To the extent that 
there is in fact a problem, it will benefit all of mankind, 
albeit not symmetrically. We have noted, however, that 
unilateral action by the United States has altered the nature 
of the problem to some extent from bi-directional to uni-
directional transfrontier pollution, and this has eroded 
somewhat the degree of interest interdependence inherent in 
the nature of the conflict. This is reinforced by differences 
in technologies and possible costs of emissions abatement 
between the U.S. and other major CFC producers and users. 
Interest interdependence therefore remains positive, but 
less so than may formerly have been the case. 
Relationship quality. As we have noted, the relationship 
quality between the U.S. and the other major CFC producers 
and users remains good. All are developed, market-economy 
countries at comparable stages of economic development, which 
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should aid consensus-building. Open channels of communications 
and organizations such as OECD should help to cement the 
quality of the relationship. However, to the extent that 
Communist countries and developing nations gain in importance 
as CFC emitters, the relationship quality can be expected to 
deteriorate. While some may place a premium on relationships 
with the U.S. on ecological matters, others may opt for a 
"free rider" position. Moreover, U.S. pressure tactics and 
incessant nagging on other risk-related ecological and 
safety issues may have further soured relationships and made 
other countries increasingly circumspect about following the 
American lead. 
We conclude, therefore, that the CFC problem at present 
falls in the upper right quadrant of our conflict management 
matrix, presented in Exhibit 5. Before the unilateral U.S. 
actions on CFCs in non-essential aerosols, collaboration was 
probably the unambiguous objective of U.S. international 
policy--combining high stakes and power with good relationship 
quality and a positive-sum game. Since then, and with growing 
conflicts on a range of issues extending from nuclear power 
to automobile safety, the appropriate conflict management 
strategy has probably moved toward the southwest, toward 
compromise. This will be reinforced as developing and 
eommunist countries gain relatively as CFC emitters. 
Nevertheless, international cooperation and collaboration in 
the global ozone management problem remains clearly the most 
promising overall strategy for the United States. 
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Implementing a Strategy 
The kind of strategy that is suggested by the foregoing 
model ought to have a number of distinct but interrelated 
dimensions. Several of these stand out as being of paramount 
importance. 
Scientific consensus. First and foremost, there is a 
need to develop a consensus on the scientific basis and 
validity of the ozone depletion theory. Present indications 
are that any observations of shifts in stratospheric ozone 
and their linkage to the presence of CFCs will be a long time 
in coming. Even the presence of CFCs in the stratosphere has 
been subject to a great deal of controversy. Any collaborative 
approach to the problem depends fundamentally on scientific 
consensus under such uncertain conditions. This consensus 
must extend to basic agreement on the risks involved. In 
order to avoid a deterioration in relationship quality, 
scientific consensus must be reached voluntarily with an 
absolute minimum of pressure. The publication of major 
studies in 1979 and 1980 in the U.S. may help in moving 
closer to a scientific consensus. Additional progress 
could be made through the International Council of Scientific 
Unions (ICSU) and its Scientific Committee on Problems of 
the Environment (SCOPE), which links the national academies 
of science of various nations. This could be accomplished 
by means of an initiative through the International 
Environmental Policy Committee (IEPC) of the National Academy 
of Sciences. 
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Risk reduction techniques. Agreement. on the underlying 
scientific relationships should develop a consensus on the basic 
sources of risk and on the magnitude of these risks. These 
should be pushed further at an international level, perhaps 
through a study conducted by a recognized institution such 
as the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria, on risk reduction and 
modification. This should also include work on different 
national perceptions of risk and possible differences in 
response-patterns. Rather than engaging in cost-benefits 
analyses, such studies should be limited to a cooperative, 
international investigation of the risks involved, their 
consequences, and ways of modifying them 
Technical substitution aspects. Costs of substitutes 
for CFCs have been investigated in great detail in the 
United States, but again it is our impression that no effort 
has been made to reach an international consensus. This 
should be high on the list of international collaborative 
activities. Work along such lines should be commissioned 
by an international organization such as UNEP or OECD and 
carried out by responsible research organizations such as 
Battelle, Mathematica or their counterparts abroad. 
Cost-benefit analyses. A recent report to EPA prepared by 
the National Research Council contains elements of all of 
the above, plus a serious attempt at extended cost-benefit 
analysis. It will doubtless have an impact abroad, as well 
52 
as generating renewed controversy. Cost-benefit assessments 
of the CFC problem and its resolution should next be taken 
into the international arena to involve researchers from 
other countries ana aid in the task of building a consensus. 
This should probably be done under the auspices of the 
Environment and Industry Division of the OECD environment 
directorate, and be lagged somewhat behind the aforementioned 
efforts at reaching consensus on the scientific, risk, and 
technical dimensions of concern. 
Formulation of prototype policies. Based on the kinds 
of international collaborative efforts just outlined, it 
should be possible to reach agreement on a set of "appropriate" 
policies for the use of CFCs, again under the auspices of OECD. 
This could take the form of a formal "code of conduct," which 
has been the result of international discussions of other 
difficult areas in the past--such as the operations of 
multinational companies. Or it could result in a set of 
general "principles" or "guidelines" that are not legally 
binding but might possess considerable intellectual 
force--such as the "polluter pays principle" negotiated in 
OECD several years ago. 
Bilateral initiatives. While we are placing a great 
deal of emphasis on the value of international collaborative 
attempts to achieve consensus on ozone management policies, 
this should not preclude significant bilateral initiatives 
on the part of the United States. Examples include the 
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formation of coalitions between the U.S. and major foreign 
CFC producing and consuming countries in furtherance of 
least-cost, preemptive solutions; communications between the 
U.S. and foreign environmental groups; dissemination of 
information on the CFC problem through U.S. and foreign media; 
subsidized research and development as well as direct 
assistance, preferably channelled through international 
organizations, to the poorer among foreign country governments; 
and development and implementation of a workable global 
monitoring system. In all such activities, close links 
should be forged between the responsible U.S. agencies--
particularly EPA and the Department of State--and overt 
pressure tactics should be avoided at all costs. However, 
consideration should be given to the possibility of delaying 
further unilateral U.S. actions until an international 
consensus has been reached. 
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* Reciprocal Transfrontier Pollution 
1. Introduction 
by 
Rudiger Pethig ** 
Production and consumption activities generate waste products 
or residuals which cause pollution when they are discharged into 
the environment. In general, residuals stem from geographically 
identifiable sources of pollution. But the residual discharge is 
followed by ecological diffusion processes the extend of which 
depends on the residuals' characteristics as well as on the pro-
perties of the recipient environmental medium (air, water). 
Political boundaries often separate connected ecological systems 
so that one country's residuals discharge may cause pollution in 
other countries. In this case we are confronted with transfron-
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developed from a larger study on ozone management sponsored by 
the Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of 
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Gladwin, I.L. Ugelow and I. Walter are gratefully acknowledged. 
The author is, of course, responsible for the remaining errors. 
** Professor of Economics and Public Finance at the Universi-
ty of Oldenburg/West Germany. 
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tier pollution, 1 ) which may be one-directional or multi-direc-
tional. The prototype of a one-directional transfrontier pollu-
tion problem is that of an upstream polluter and the downstream 
pollutee. But from a systematic point of view the general case 
of transfrontier pollution is of the multi- directional or re-
ciprocal type and there are, in fact, many empirical examples of 
reciprocal transfrontier pollution (RTP) problems. These range 
from small-scale "regional" and medium-size "international" to 
truly "global" problems like ocean pollution or pollution of the 
stratosphere cause e.g. by supersonic aircraft, by chlorofluoro-
carbons releases or by carbondioxide from the use of fossile 
energy resources. 
In order to emphasize the empirical relevance of global RTP the 
nature and hazards of the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)-ozone prob-
lem serves as a good example: 2 )The ozone layer in the stratosphere 
can be viewed as a global "common property" resource. Its bene-
ficialservices of shielding the earth from damaging ultraviolet 
radiation and maintaining the current surface temperature were 
taken as free goods until recently natural scientists discovered 
that worldwide releases of CFCs cause gradual depletion of the 
ozone layer. This in turn has two major negative feedbacks: 
First it increases health hazards, in particular the risk of skin 
cancer. Furthermore, it deteriorates production conditions mainly 
in the agricultural sector by changing the mean annual surface 
temperature. 3 ) These adverse effects are worldwide and, even more 
1) There are varions earlier studies on transfrontier pollution. 
See, for example, OECD (1974a), I. Walter (1975), J.R.Markusen 
(1975), R. d'Arge (1976), H. Tulkens (1979). 
2) For the following see, in particular, M.J. Molina and F.S. 
Rowland (1974) Committee on Impacts of Stratospheric Change 
(1976), T.B. Stoel, R.I. Compton, and S.M. Gibbons (1977), I. 
Walter, T.N. Gladwin, and I.L. Ugelow (1978), Umweltbundes-
amt (1978). _ 
3) The available evidence on changes of surface temperature and 
its welfare cost appears to be controverse - even with respect 
to the "sign" of the effects. Probably any climate change in-
duced by CFCs releases represents a negative production ex-
ternality worldwide. See also R.C. d'Arge and V.K. Smith (1978). 
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important, they are almost independent of the emitting country. 4 ) 
Hence the discharge of CFCs by one country not only diminishes 
its own welfare but also the welfare of all other countries. The 
emitting country only bears part of the damage and creates nega-
tive externalities for all other countries. Thus for the set of 
countries that are the (major) CFCs-polluters the release of CFCs 
constitutes a RTP problem whereas the rest of the world suffers 
passively from transfrontier pollution of the upstream-downstream 
type. 
From the basic idea of the polluters-pay -principle which appears 
to be widely accepted in the transfrontier pollution context, 5 ) 
it follows that the polluting countries should take action to stop 
or at least cut back their residuals emissions. But here we are at 
the heart of the problem. If one polluting country implements a 
unilateral national effluent regulation policy it bears the full 
costs (consisting of "regulation inputs" and losses from weakened 
international competitiveness) of its program. But at the same 
time it creates a twofold benefit for the other polluting coun-
tries: Their relative international competitiveness is streng-
thened and they take a free rider position with regard to the 
reduced environmental damage. Even if all polluting countries 
carry out some uncoordinated national policy to reduce their 
own residuals emission, the overall impact is likely to be in-
sufficient unless substantial cooperation between the polluting 
countries is reached. A basic requirement for cooperation is to 
reach agreement on the overall effort necessary to reduce the 
transfrontier pollution. But it is even more important and diffi-
cult to agree on the relative cost shares. Hence an efficient 
and fair solution to RTP problems essentially presupposes inter-
national bargaining among the polluting countries. 
It is the objective of this paper to clarify the analytical 
4) "Whatever is released is, before long, mixed throughout the 
atmosphere", Committee on Impacts of Stratospheric Change 
(1976,p. 2). 
5) At least this observation holds for the OECD-member countries. 
See OECD (1974). 
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structure of RTP problems and to investigate solution possibili-
ties under various behavioural assumptions. In section 2 the mo-
del is exposed. For the issue under consideration it must be 
viewed as a "minimum model" omitting many complicating features 
of reality. This simple model is transformed in several steps 
until the game theoretic nature of the RTP problem becomes evi-
dent: We end up with a two person game in which each player's 
strategy space is the national residuals emission level and where 
his pay-off-function is some "derived" welfare function defined 
on the joint strategy set. Section 3 shows the allocative and wel-
fare impact of non-cooperative behavior. The solution concept of 
an equilibriumpoint is applied. It clarifies the analogy of our 
problem to oligopoly theory where the entrepreneurs exhibit 
Cournot-type behavior. The result that noncooperative behavior 
leads to Pareto-inferior allocations implies that there are, in 
general, opportunities for mutually beneficial bargaining or nego-
tiations. Of particular interest for the RTP problem is the issue 
of unilateral national emission regulation, that are implemented 
by one country prior to (or instead of) international negotiations. 
The model of this paper supports the view that "moderate" unila-
teral reductions of emissions are rational (welfare increasing) 
for the regulating country if this country beliefs that the other 
country will remain inactive. Furthermore, negotiations remain 
advantageous for both sides, in general, even after unilateral 
regulations have been implemented. 
In section 4 various aspects of the RTP bargaining problem are 
addre~sed.First, the Nash solution concept for simple bargaining 
games is introduced. Such games are characterized by a predeter-
mined conflict situation, that specifies the disagreement payoffs. 
But it appears reasonable to make the disagreement payoffs endo-
genous to the game, which leads to a so-called general bargai-
ning game including the concept of mutually optimal threat stra-
tegies. This concept takes care of the two countries' bargaining 
power in a sophisticated way and therefore appears to be a 
satisfactory approach on the conceptual level. Then the issue of 
unilateral residuals emission regulation is reconsidered in the 
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context of the general bargaining game. We show that the unila-
teral reduction of emissions by one country does not influence 
the outcome of the bargaining process if the reduction is not 
"too strong". Otherwise, the country which has implemented uni-
lateral regulation can avoid unfavourable bargaining results (due 
to this regulation) only if it threatens the other country con-
vincingly to adopt less restrictive emission regulation in case 
of a conflict. 
The final subsection is devoted to strategic manipulation. Al-
though this issue arises in various social contexts it appears 
to be particularly significant in RTP bargaining situations: At 
the present state of scientific evidence diverging national dama-
ge assessments can be defended without being obviously incompa-
tible with the available "knowledge". Hence each country has an 
incentive not to report its true assessment. Strategic manipu-
lation of this type clearly affects the bargaining process and 
may lead to allocative inefficiency. 
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2. The Model 
For simplicity we restrict the subsequent analysis to the case 
of two countries. We further exclude from our analysis foreign 
trade effects of residuals discharge regulations. There are, of 
course, substantial trade flows between many pairs of countries 
(and the rest of the world), so that our assumption to complete-
ly ignore international trade is a loss of realism. It appears 
acceptable as a first approach, however, if it can be assumed 
that regulation-induced changes of trade flows in RTP related 
products do not lead to major trade dislocations. 6 ) 
The third simplifying basic assumption is that we neg-
lect intertemporal aspects 7 ) of the problem that may play 
an important role for various reasons. For example, accelerated 
residuals releases may adversely affect the natural recovery rate 
of the environment and lead-lag relationships in national efflu-
ent regulation may influence the countries' bargaining power and, 
hence, the bargaining solution itself. Various studies on RTP 
problems also stress the issue of irreversibilities that cannot 
be adequately handled in a static framework. Uncertainty and risk 
are further principle characteristics of RTP issues that are not 
appropriately considered in this paper, since we assume simple 
point estimastes for costs and benefits that may, however, re-
flect diverging damage assessments between countries. In summary, 
even though we aieaware of various simplifications of the subse-
quent analysis we feel that significant parts of the allocation 
problem remain to be clarified in the absence of the complications 
listed above. The limitations of the model must, however, be con-
sidered when its results are interpreted or used for policy re-
commendations. 
6) This assumption appears to be safe in the CFCs-ozone problem 
where according to I. Walter et.al. (1978, p. 176) " .•• interna-
tional economic dislocations to be experienced by the U.S ••.. 
would be miniscule in comparison to the purely domestic econo-
mic dislocations", even though they depend considerably on the 
regulatory scenario chosen. Trade effects are explicitly ana-
lysed in the approach of J.R. Markusen (1975). With substantial 
analytical effort, international trade could be incorporated 
into the present model along the lines elaborated by H. Sie-
bert, J. Eichberger, R. Gronych and R. Pethig (1980). 
7) For interesting intertemporal studies of related problems see 
G.R. Munro (1978) and H. Tulkens (1979). 
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We now proceed to specify the model in detail. In the paper the 
superscript or subscript i indicates variables relating to coun-
try i (i = 1,2). By ei we denote the residuals emission of coun-
try i. The state of the environment in country i is described by 
a real valued indicator si. It is assumed that si is uniquely 
determined by the emissions e 1 and e 2 of both countries via the 
differentiable and convex environmental interaction function 8 ) 
( 1 ) ( i=1, 2) 
satisfyi~g9 ) Si(O,O) _= o, s~,s~ >O, and s~ 2 s~ 1 ~ o. The diffe-
rence S 1 (e 1 ,e 2 ) - S 1 (0,0) will be interpreted as the deteriora-
tion of country i's environment when the amounts e 1 and e 2 of 
residuals are released into the air. If the cross derivative of 
Si is positive, the marginal damage of one country's emission is 
positively correlated to the other country's total emission. In 
this case there is no unambiguous way to assign the "proper" da-
mage share to each polluter. 
In the case of global RTP we observe rapid and perfect diffusion 
of residuals in the world's ecological system, e.g. the strato-
sphere, so that the effects of a given emission may be (almost) 
independent of the location of the polluting source. This hypo-
thesis is captured in equation (1) by the special case that 
s 1 = s 2 =sand thats satisfies s 1 = s 2 for every given (e 1 ,e 2l. 
Then the damage only depends on the aggregate (world-wide) 
e~ission e 1 + e 2 . Another special case is obtained if Si > O but 
Si = 0 for i,j = 1,2 (i * j). For ei > O we have one-dire~tional 
8) For more details about this concept of an "environmental 
interaction function" or "pollution function" see R. Pethig 
( 1979a, 1979b). 
9) In this paper wie apply the convention that for a function 
F(x,y) the derivatives are denoted by Fx:= aF/ ax, Fxx==a 2F/ 
ax2, Fxy== aF/axay etc. As an additional simplification we 
write Fi instead of Fx if and only if x=ei (i=1 ,2). If no 
confusion is possible we also write, for example, F instead 
of F , if x=q. (i=1,2). q 
X l 
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10) transfrontier pollution where country i is located upstream. ' 
In the next step we introduce the negative feedbacks of pollu-
tion on the economies. First the state of the environment is 
assumed to affect the consumers' well-being. Each country's wel-
fare is determined by a differentiable and strictly concave 11 l 
welfare funtion 
(2) (i=1,2) 
~i ~i ~i 
such that W > O and W < O. The negative partial derivative Ws q s 
reflects the marginal welfare loss of adverse health impacts 
and other damage due to increased pollution, whereas Wi indicates 
q 
the welfare gain of a small increase in the quantity qi of coun-
try i's consumption good (= "national product"). Note also that 
the concept of concavity of a function presupposes that its do-
main is a convex set. Hence the domain D(~i) of the welfare func-
-Ai ~+ 
tion W and W, which is the "consumption sets" of country i in 
economic interpretation, is assumed to be convex. It is clearly 
plausible that this consumption set is bounded from above with 
respect to the state of the environment and does not include zero 
consumption of the consumption good. The introduction of these 
properties would create complications in the subsequent analysis 
of some "derived" consumption sets (which to some extent could 
be solved by tedeousarguments) . 12 ) For simplicity of exposition 
1o) These remarks on one-directional transfrontier pollution show 
that the analytical framework of this paper is also adequate 
to handle this type of pollution problem. The major difference 
to RTP and the only reason why we do not elaborate this spe-
cial case (Si= O for j = 1 or j = 2) is that allocative effi-
ciency would require transfer payments. 
11) This assumption is much more restictive than the standard 
hypothesis of quasi-concavity, which would be sufficient for 
all results of the paper except for the proof that the wel-
fare possibility set is convex. The welfare function can be 
viewed as a representation of social preference ordering. It 
is known that not every preference ordering which can be re-
presented by a (continuous) quasi-concave function can also 
be represented by a concave function. For necessary and suffi-
cient conditions see w. Fenchel (1956) and for approximation 
results see Y. Kannai (1974). 
12) See, for example, the procedure in R. Pethig (1979a). 
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we avoid these difficulties in this paper by assuming that 
D (,._w~ i) = IR.2 for · 1 2 + l. = , . 
The second negative externality of pollution consists of deterio-
rating production possibilities. 13 ) With fixed factor endowments 
(which are not made explicit here) the countries' production 
possibilities are specified by the differentiable transformation 
functions 14 ) 
( 3) (i=1, 2) 
satisfying T~ > O and Ti< O. For given s. ?. O, the graph of 
4' l. s l. 
Tl.(ei,si) is country i's production possibility frontier bet-
ween the consumption good (qi) and residuals generation (ei) that 
is assumed to be a (useless) by-product in the production of the 
consumption good. 15 ) T~ >O establishes the by-product property of . l. 
residuals and T~ <O implies that ceteris paribus the production 
possibilities decrease with increasing pollution. Figure 1 illu-
4i 
strates the transformation function T from eq. (3) for three 
different values of si. It is well-known that production exter-
nalities like the state of the environment in the present model 
generate conceptual analytical difficulties by making the pro-
duction set non-convex 16 l or the transformation function non-con-
cave, respectively. Even if the transformation curve Ti is strict-
ly concave for given si - as depicted in figure 1, it is logi-
cally impossible that the complete function is concave (given the 
assumption Ti < O) on an unbounded domain. However, one can 
s 4' 
"guarantee" concavity of Ti in the relevant part of its domain 
13) The "costs" of decreasing temperature in the case of strato-
spheric pollution and their order of magnitude are studied 
by R. d'Arge (1976). J.R. Markusen (1975) does not include 
production externalities in his model. 
14) For a more detailed discussion of these concepts see R. Pethig 
(1977) and R. Pethig (1979a). 
15) It is also possible that residuals are not only released in 
the course of production but also in (or after) the process 
of consumption. Here we neglect these complicating aspects 
of the problem. See, for example, I. Walter et.al. (1978). 
16) See D.A. Starrett (1972). 
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as follows. 17 ) Since factor endowments are fixed it is not 
possible to "produce" arbitrarily large amounts of residuals. 
Let e~ be the maximum attainable residuals emission18 l and de-
fine~~:= Si(e01 ,e02 ) and D(Ti) := { (e.,s.) E IR+2 / e.:: e 01., J_ A' J_ J_ J_ 







With equations (3) our model is completed. Its analytical struc-
ture may best be summarised by figure 2, where the two countries' 
interdependency via their emissions e 1 and e 2 is illustrated. It 
is, however, possible and also convenient for our further study 
to establish this interdependency in a more direct way. For this 
purpose we consider the eqs. (1) in eqs. (3) and define "derived" 
transformation functions by 
(3 I) (i,j= 1,2; i * j) 
17) The following procedure is discussed in a more general set-
ting by R. Pethig (1979a, p. 154 n.). 























The next step is to establish that the function Ti is strictly 
concave on the set D(Ti) := {(e1 ,e 2 ) ER+2 I for i= 1,2: (e.,s.) E . . ]. ]. 
D(T1 ) and si = S 1 (e 1 ,e2 ) l = { (e 1 ,e 2 ) EIR~ I for i=1,2 : ei.'.:. e~} A' 
under the assumptions that have been made about the functions T1 
]_ • - - Ai - -
and S . Consider (e 1 ,e 2 ), (e 1 ,e2 ) E D(T ) , (e 1 ,e 2 ) * (e 1 ,e 2 ) and 
define e.,_ := >-e.+ (1- >-) e. for i=1 ,2. We have to show that 
i ]. i 1 ]. i - -
T (e 1 ,_,e 2 ,_) > >-T (e 1 ,e2 ) + (1- :) T (e 1 ,e~! =: qiA for :".'ery 
,-E (0,1). Strict concavity of T1 yields T1 (e.,_,s.,_)> >-T 1 (e.,s.) + 
Ai - - A i ]_ _l. i - l._ ]_ 
(1- >-) T (ei,si) =: qi>-' where si:= S (e 1 '.e 2 ), si := S (e 1 ,e 2 )and 
si>- := >-si + (1- >-si). By definition of T1 i~ (3') we conc~ude 
qi>-= ~i>-" Hence theA~roof is completed if T1 (ei\'ej\) = T1 
[e.,,S1 (e.,,e.,)];.; T1 (e.,,s.,) for i*j. This inequality holds 
l./\ . l./\ JI\ ,l./\ l./\ 
since T~ < 0 and. since S 1 (e 1 " ,e2 ,_) < si,- by the strict convexity 
assumption on S1 . 
i Ai i i Ai Ai i > 
Observe that T. =TS. <O and T. = T. +TS. - O depending on 
J SJ ]_ ]_ Ais l_ < 
how strong the production externali ty (T < 0) is. The (partial) s . 
graph of the derived transformation function T1 is shown in 
figure 3 for two alternatively given values of e.(i,j=1,2; i*j). 
J 
Thus it is made explicit how country j's emission ej affects ad-





T (e.,e. O) 
l. ) 
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Similar to the generation of eqs. (3') from eqs. (1) and (3) 
we now take eqs. (1) in order to transform eqs. (2) into eqs. 
(2 I): 
(2 I) w. l. 
(i=1 ,2) 
Since IRi is_the domain of ;i and of Si it is obvious that the 
domain of Wl. is~!- By the same arguments used for the proof 
of strict concavity of the function Ti one can show that the 
function Wi is also strictly concave under the assumptions 
made on Si and :i. In addition we obtain Wi > 0 as well as 
Ai Ai q 
W. < O and W. < O. We now proceed to "compress" the model by com-
J. J A • 
bining the derived welfare function WJ. from (2') with the deri-
ved transformation function Ti from (3'). This yields 
(4) 
The domain of the function Wi is D(Ti), hence a convex set. We 
claim that Wi is a strictly concave function provided that the 
functions Ti and Wi are strictly concave satisfying Wi > 0. To 
-- i q __ 
show this consider (e 1 ,e 2), (e 1 ,e2 ) E D(T ) , (e 1 ,e2 ) * (e 1 ,e2), 
and define e. 1 := :>-e. + (1- A) e. etc. as above. We have to l. /\ . l. . l. . . l. l. J.--
establish that~ (eH,e2 ") > AW (~ 1 ,e2 ) + (1- A )W (e 1 ,e2 ) =: wiA. 
Setting q. := Tl.(e 1 ,e 2 ), q. := Tl.(e1 ,e2 ) and q. ,_= :>-q. + (1- A) qi 
. Ail. AI l.Ai - l._ -
yields W (qiA,e1A,e 2 ") > AW (qi,e 1:~ 2 ) + (1- :>-) W (qi,e 1 ,e 2 ) by 
the strict concavity of function Wi. The right-hand side of this 
inequality is equal tow,. by definition of the function Wi in 
/\ l. • A • 
(4). Hence the pr~of is completed if Wi(e1 ,_,e 2 ,_) ~ Wi(qi:>-'elA' 
e 2 ,_). Note that Ti(e1 ,_,e 2 ") >qi A' ~~nee Ti is strictly concave. 
When combined with the assumption W~ > o, the desired result is 
obtained. The definition of wi in (4) shows that the world allo-
cation problem is uniquely determined by selecting some attainab-
le emission tuple (e 1 ,e2 ) EE= D(T 1 ) = D(T2 ). Such a tuple not 
only determines the "consumption allocation" via (3') (and im-
plicit in (4)) but also some "welfare allocation" (w1 ,w2 ). More 
generally, the eqs. (4) define a mapping W from the set of 
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attainable emission allocations, E, into the two-dimensional 
space of welfare allocations. This mapping generates a welfare 
possibility set, denoted by W(E). Since Eis compact and convex 
and Wis a continuous vector function, the welfare possibility 
set W(E) is also compact and convex. 
So far, we have not used the methods and the language of game 
theory explicitly. It is clear, however, that the model can be 
described (and summarized)as a two-person non-zero sum game G := 
1 2 o o {2,E1 ,E 2 ,w ,w } , where E1 := [ 0,e1 ], E2 := [o,e2 ] are the 
players' strategy sets and where the welfare functions w1 and w2 
are the players' payoff functions. In section 3 we analyse and 
evaluate the equilibrium point of this game presupposing non-
cooperative behavior, and section 4 concentrates on cooperation 
and bargaining. 
3. Non-cooperative Behavior 
3.1 The Concept of Equilibrium Points 
An equilibriumpoint19 l of the game G = {2,E1 ,E 2 ,w1 ,W2}is defined 
by a strategy tuple (e1 ,e2 ) satisfying 
(5) for every e 1 E E1 , and 
for every e 2 E E2 . 
In order to show that under the assumptions made in section 2 
there exists an equilibrium point for the game, we first c~nsider 
19) See, for example, J.C. Harsanyi (1977, p. 104). This concept 
is also used in oligopoly theory dating back to Cournot. See, 
for example, J.M. Henderson and R.E. Quandt (1971, chapter 
6.3). The analogy of externality and public good issues to 
oligopoly theory and game theory was already stressed by 0.A. 
Davis and A. Whinston (1962), G. Campa (1967) and H. Shibata 
(1971). 
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the "reaction function" for player i {i,j=1,2; i * j): 
i i i ~ R (eJ.), where R (eJ.) is a solution to max W {e. ,e.). 
'e' .EE. l. J 
l. l. 
(6) 
Ri(e.) is country i's best-reply strategy, if e. is the (given) 
J J 
strategy of country j. In view of the definition of the function 
Wi,Ri(ej) is identical to the solution o~ maximising Wi(qi,e 1 ,e 2 ) 
over ei subject to the constraint qi~ T1 (e 1 ,e2 ). In figure 4 the 
line ABCDEF represents the graph of T1.(for given e. = e.) and the 
add c b a J J 
four lines wi to wi (wi < wi < wi < wi) are indifference curves be-
longing to wi for given e .. The maximum is attained in the tan-
20) J 
gency point c. 
qi 
A 
Figure 4 0 
The maximization procedure defined in (6) can also be directly 
illustrated with the help of the function wi. 
20) T~e marg~n~t condition satisfied in this tangency point is 
Ti= -{WflWl.). With this information, the national environ-
mental prot~ction agency can implement the emission standard 
R{e2) {for.given foreign emission e2), if it levies an emis-
sion tax Tr measured in terms of the consumption good. For de-
tails see Pethig (1979a, 1979b). 

















Since Wi is a strictly concave function its upper contour sets 
are strictly convex. In figure 5 four indifference curves wf to 
wf belonging to Wi (and not to Wi like those in figure 4) are 
depicted, satisfying w~ < w~ < w~ < w~. In order to see that the l. l. l. l. 
figures 4 and 5 are closely related, suppose that OA' = ej in 
figure 5, where e. is the parametric value of e . used in figure 4 
J • J A • 
in the transformation curve Tl. and in the welfare function Wi. 
Then the points A,B,C,D,E, and F completely correspond to the 
points A', B' etc. in figure 5. The welfare level rises from 
A(A') up to C(C') and then declines to F(F'). In fact, for given 
ej = ej the maximum domestic welfare is attained at the point C 
or C', respectively. Since in figure 5 the whole set Eis densely 
covered by indifference curves of the function wi, we obtain some 
line GH as the locus of all maxima of indifference curves. This 
line GH is the graph of the domestic reaction function Rias de-
finded in (6). 
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We now want to show that the game G has an equilibrium point under 
the assumptions of section 2. By definition of Ri (i=1 ,2), the 
tuple (e1 ,e2 ) is an equilibrium point of G if and only if e. = . . l. 
R1 (RJ(e.)). This equivalence will be utilized to answer the exi-
1. 
stence question in the affirmative. First, we recall that the 
function Wi is strictly concave. Hence the functions Ri : Ej • Ei 
and Rj : E. • E. are well-defined and continuous on their respec-
1. J 
tive domains. Consider now the function (j): E • E, defined by 
(j) [ 1 2 l 1 2 . 21) (J)(e 1 ,e2 ) := R (e 2 ), R (e 1 ) . Since R and R are continuous , 
the function (j) is also continuous on E. Furthermore, E c m2 is non-
empty, compact and convex. Hence there exists (e1 ,e2 )such that 
(e1 ,e2) = (J) (e1 ,e2) by Brouwer' s fixed point theorem. 22 i 
This existence result does not presuppose that the reaction func-
tions are monotone or negatively sloped. The slope of Riis ob-
tained when we set the derivative w~ = WiT~ + w~ equal to zero 
l. q1. l. 




wi T~T~ + WiT~. + w~ T~ + Wi.T~ + W. 
(7) l. SIS! l. J SI l. J 1.g; J SIJ l. 1.j de. J Wi (T~)2 2w~ T~ WiT~. w~. J + + + qq l. 1.q l. q l. l. l. l. 
Obviously, one need additional assumptions on various derivatives 
in order to guarantee that the right-hand side of eq. (7) has nega-
tive sign. It should also be clear that, in general, multiple 
equilibrium points will exist. Monotonicity of the reaction func-
tions is not sufficient to guarantee uniqueness. 
In figure 6 the lines HG and LK are the graphs of the functions R1 
and R2 , respectively. Hence their point of intersection, S, re-
presents an equilibrium point. Figure 6 shows, furthermore, that 
21) Clearly, R1 and R2 are not only continuous on E1 and E2 , 
respectively, but also on E. 
22) See, for example, G. Debreu (1959, p. 17). 
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Sis also the point of intersection between the indifference 
curve QNST belonging to the domestic country and the indifference 
curve UPSW belonging to the foreign country. Such an intersec-
tion of indifference curves in an equilibrium point is not "acci-
dental", since by definition of R1 and R2 the (unique) indiffe-
rence curve of country 1 that passes through the point Sin figu-
re 6 must have zero slope with respect to the e 1-axis, whereas the 
indifference curve of country 2 that passes through S must have 
zero slope with respect to the ej-axis in point S. This in turn 
implies that the welfare allocation associated to an equilibrium 
4 
point is dominated, i.e. there exist strategies (e 1 ,e2 )E E such 
1 >1-- 2 >2--. that W (e 1 ,e2 ) - W (e1 ,e2 ) and W (e 1 ,e2 ) - W (e 1 ,e 2)with at least 
one inequality holding strictly. To prove this we consider the 
problem of max~mizing wi = Wi(e 1 ,e2 ) on E subject to the con-
straint wj .::. wJ (e 1 ,e2 ) (with wj constant). Its solution yields 
as a necessary condition for an undominated welfare allocation 
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(and for interior points of E) the equation 
w~ w~ 
(8) J. J. 
w~ w~ 
J J 
This tangency condition of indifference curves is satisfied in 
figure 6 along the dotted line LMNPG. It is helpful to give an 
alternative illustration of these results using the set of 
attainable welfare allocations which has been derived at the 













In figure 7 the points L',N' ,P',G' and S' correspond to the 
points L,N,P,G and S of figure 5. All points in the shaded area 
S'N'P' (except the point S' itself) represent welfare allocations 
which dominate the welfare allocation assigned to the point s•. 23 ) 
Hence this region is the negotiation or bargaining area. Except 
degenerate cases this area is non-empty so that both countries 
can improve their welfare position by bargaining. Before we turn 
23) Note that the shaded area N'S'P' in figure 7 corresponds to 
the shaded area QNSPU in figure 6. 
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our attention to the bargaining issue we wish to further investi-
gate some questions related to non-cooperative behaviour , that 
became empirically relevant, for example, in the ozone case by 
the unilateral ("non-cooperative") decision of the U.S. to ban 
certain CFCs emissions. 
3.2 An Evaluation of Unilateral Emission Regulations 
Until now we (implicitly) assumed that both countries act on the 
basis of full and true information on the detrimental effects of 
pollution. The historical course of events was different, however, 
in the CFCs-ozone problem: Some years ago politicians and citi-
zens were completely ignorant of these effects and they became 
convinced of the common environmental threat only gradually and -
as it appears - not in every country to the same extent. In terms 
of our model the case of ignorance can be expressed as follows. 
The politicians in each country believe that the state of the 
stratosphere does not generate negative externalities for pro-
ducers and consumers, i.e. the (point) expectation is, that 
~i Ai > 
Ws =Ts= 0 for every si - O and for i=1,2. Under these hypotheses 
the two countries' welfare states are not expected to be mutually 
interdependent via their respective residuals emission. Hence 
in the countries' perception national welfare maximization implies 
the maximization of the national product. This requires, in turn, 
to raise emissions up to the maximum levels e~ and e~. 
Suppose now that natural sciences provide the true information 
about the detrimental effects of pollution and assume that coun-
try 1 relies upon this information while country 2 does not. 24 ) 
24) Such a situation was given in the CFCs-ozone problem. 
According to I. Walter et.al. (1978, p. 38) " ... it appears 
that both public and official opinion in Europe did not 
rate the (CFCs-ozone, R.P.) problem as highly as did Ameri-
cans". In the meantime (March 26, 1980) the Council of the 
European Community determined (1) not to increase produc-
tion of certain CFCs and (2) to reduce (but not to ban!) 
the use of CFCs in aerosol cans. 
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In this situation the emission level e~ will be maintained by 
country 2, because it is still welfare-maximizing relative to 
this country's unchanged belief that residuals emission is not 
harmful. On the other hand, country 1 is now convinced that its 
welfare depends on e 1 and on e 2 as well, i.e., that the welfare 
function w1 from eq. (4) applies with indifference curves as 
drawn in figure 5. As long as country 1 cannot convince the 
other country of the correct view of the pollution impacts there 
is no hope for cooperation. 25 >But it is evident form figure 5 
that in this case country 1 can improve its welfare position by 
unilateral emission reduction. In other words, if country 1 be-
lieves that country 2 will stick to its emission level e~, its 
best strategy is to reduce its own emission from e~ to R1 (e~). 
In figure 5 this action means a move from point Z to point H. It 
turns out that R1 (e~) is country 1's maximum strategy 26 )from the 
game theoretic point of view. The optimal unilateral reduction 
of emissions, e~ - R1 (e~), is the greater the stronger the nega-
tive consumption and production externalities are and the smaller 
the costs of emission reduction are in terms of consumption good 
forgone, i.e. the smaller T~ evaluated at s 1 = o. Observe that 
R1 (e~) = o is possible. In this case the unilateral complete ban 
on residuals emission is optimal. Given that country 1 's view on 
damage from pollution is also correct for the other country then 
country 2 always costlessly benefits from the unilateral emission 
reduction e~ - R1 (e~). This can be seen from figure 6 when mo-
ving from z to H, and in figure 7, where Z' and H' are assumed 
0 0 to represent the welfare allocations assigned to (e 1 ,e2 ) and 
1 o o (R (e 2 ) ,e2 ), respectively. 
25) In this context, the Natural Resource Defense Council be-
lieves that "the formation of a consensus among scientists 
of different nations on the gravity of the •. (RTP, R.P.) 
problem is perhaps the most important prerequisite to effec-
tive regulation worldwide" (T.B. Stoel, Jr., R.I. Compton, 
and S.M. Gibbons (1977, p. 131); quoted from I. Walter, T.N. 
Gladwin and I.L. Ugelow (1978, p. 182~. 
26) See J. Harsanyi (1977, p. 105). 
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The considerations above on the optimality of unilateral regu-
lation crucially depend on the regulating country's belief that 
the other country will not join its own view of the detrimental 
impact of pollution. The relevant question is, however, what 
the regulating country can gain by convincing the other country 
of the validity of its own damage assessment. To see this we 
suppose now that country 2 does accept the scientific evidence 
of damage from pollution after country 1 reduced its emission 
from e~ to R1 (e~). The consequences of this new situation are 
rather different depending on whether cooperation takes place or 
not. If for one reason or another the countries do not cooperate, 
it can be expected that possibly after some period of mutual emis-
sion adjustments an equilibrium point such as Sin figure 6 is 
reached. Since the initial emission allocation was (R1 (e~) ,e~), 
the joint emission (e1 ,e2 ) prevailing in the equilibrium point 
- 1 o may be such (as in the case of figure 6) that e 1 > R (e 2 ). In 
this case it would be optimal for country 1 to increase (!) its 
emission. Even more important is, however, that the transition 
from point H to point Sin figure 6 implies a substantial welfare 
increase for country 1 whereas the welfare change for the other 
country is ambiguous. 
Even though the lack of cooperation may not be unrealistic due 
to institutional or political barriers, it remains true for all 
scenarios of non-cooperative behavior that, in general, there is 
a non-empty negotiation set irrespective of the non-cooperative 
"history", i.e., independent of wether the initial welfare allo-
cation is characterized by Z', H' or S' in figure 7. We therefore 
turn our attention to the bargaining issue now. 
4. International Bargaining 
It is intuitively clear that the solution to the bargaining prob-
lem is not, in general, independent of the conflict situation 
which is, by definition, the welfare allocation emerging in the 
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absence of any agreement. We argued in section 3.2 that one can 
conceive of different conflict situations, e.g. the points Z', 
H' oder S' in figure 7 depending on the "history of the conflict". 
For the time being we suppose that the conflict situation is un-
ambiguously determined by some (unique) equilibrium point of the 
game, say, by the point S' in figure 7. In order to elaborate the 
basic structure of the bargaining problem under this assumption 
we briefly review the classical approach. It is characterized by 
the following two rationality requirements: 27 > 
T. Individual rationality: The agreement must represent, for both 
countries, a situation at least as favourable as the conflict si-
tuation. Let w1 and w2 be the coordinates of the conflict situa-
tion (point S' in figure 7). Then the negotiation or bargaining 
set (of attainable welfare allocations) is X := { (w1 ,w2) E W(E) I 
wi ~ wi for i=1 ,2}. Individual rationality requires that the coun-
tries only agree on joint strategies (e 1 ,e 2), such that [w1 (e1 ,e 2), 
w2 (e 1 ,e 2)] EX. Geometrically, Xis the set of all points in the 
shaded area of figure 7. 
2. Joint efficiency: The agreement will represent a situation 
that could not be improved upon any further to both countries' 
advantage because rational players would not accept a given agree-
ment if some alternative arrangement could make both of them bet-
ter off. When combined with the postulate of individual ratio-
nality this postulate reduces the welfare allocations that are 
candidates for agreement in international bargaining to the set 
X := { (w1 ,w2) EX J there is no (w1 ,wzl EX satisfying wi < wi for 
i=1,2 }. In figure 7 this set Xis represented by the upper right 
boundary of the negotiation area, i.e., the line between N' and 
P'. 
In the present model the agreement set is typically non-empty and 
has more than one element. Hence the two rationality postulates 
27) See J. Harsanyi (1977, p. 141 n.). 
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stated above are insufficient to yield a unique bargaining solu-
tion. In fact, the bargaining problem in a narrower sense only 
arises whenever X contains more than one element. 28 ) 
4.1. The Nash Solution 
Since Nash's approach 29 ) to this bargaining problem in the narro-
wer sense is by now standard, we need not elaborate it in detail. 
Instead, we briefly review its presuppositions and show its imme-
diate application to the RTP issue. Each country chooses a wel"-
fare demand w1 and w2 , simultaneously and independently of each 
other. If (w1 ,w2 ) € W(E) then each country receives the welfare 
that it has been asking for. Since (w1 ,w2 ) is an attainable wel-
fare allocation, there is, by definition of W(E), at least one 
- - - i- ,.._, emission allocation (e 1 ,e2 ) € E such that wi = W (e 1 ,e2 ) for 
i=1, 2. Hence the agreement on some (w1 ,w2 ) € W (E) implies an 
agreement on bilateral emission regulation. 30 >on the other hand, 
if (w 1 ,w2 ) ~ W(E), then each country will receive its conflict 
welfare level w1 and w2 . Again, the conflict situation (w1 ,w2 ) 
is assumed to be predetermined in this section. 
The Nash solution to this bargaining game is derived from the 
following four postulates. 31 ) 
1. Joint efficiency 
This postulate has already been introduced and interpreted above. 
2. Symmetry 
The solution (w1 ,w2) of a symmetric game satisfies w1 
28) J. Harsanyi (1977, p. 128 n.). 
29) J.F. Nash (1950). 1 2 
30) If (~1 ,w2) is the image of W and W for more than one 
strategy tuple (e 1 ,e2 ) € E, then a strategy coordination pro-
blem arises, whicn does not appear to be serious when the 
number of players is small. See also J. Harsanyi (1977,p.133n.i 
31) J.F. Nash (1950). Interpretation and evaluations (and more 
formal statements) can be found in various textbooks on game 
theory. See, for example, J. Harsanyi (1977, p. 144 n.). 
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bargaining game is said to be symmetric if its conflict point 
(w1 ,w2 ) satisfies w1 = w2 and if the set W(E) is symmetric with 
respect to the w1 = w2 line. 
3. Linear invariance 
The emission allocation (e 1 ,e2 ) that is associated to a solution 
of the bargaining game is independent of the unit of measurement 
and of the zero point that we choose for each country's welfare 
function. 
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives 
Let(w1 ,w2 ) be the conflict situation and let (w1 ,w2 ) be the 
solution to the bargaining game which has the payoff space W(E). 
If W(E) is substituted by W(E) cW(E) such that (w1 ,w2 ) and (w 1 ,w2 ) 
are still elements of W(E) then(w1 ,w2 ) remains the solution to 
this new game. 
Nash has shown that under these four postulates a unique solution 
to the bargaining game exists, if the payoff space is compact and 
convex. 32 ) The payoff space of our present model is W(E) and this 
set is proved to be compact and convex in section 3. Furthermore; 
Nash gave an interesting characterization of the solution: 33 ) The 
solution (·;'1 ,w2 ) to the bargaining game maximizes the function 
v = v. ( w 1 , w 2 ; w 1 , w 2 ) : = ( w 1 - w 1 ) ( w 2 - w 2 ) on X • 
With the help of this property the Nash solution can be represen-
ted in figure 8 by the point P which is the (unique) point of 
tangancy between the boundary of W(E) and a rectangular hyperbola 
AB asymptotic to the lines S'C and S'D which in turn are parallels 
to the axes. It is obvious from figure 8 that the Nash solution 
is individually rational for both countries. 
32) J.F. Nash (1950, p. 159). 
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4.2 Mutually Optimal Threat Strategies 
So far we considered the RTP problem as a so-called two-person 
simple bargaining game characterized by some predetermined con-
flict situation or disagreement payoffs (w1 ,w2). Since the Nash 
solution is unique, the conflict payoffs (w1 ,w2 ) completely de-
~ ~ 1 2 termine the agreement payoffs Cw 1 ,w2 ) for given W, W and WCE). 
It is also easy to see that the agreement welfare allocation 
(w1 ,w2 ) in general varies when the conflict payoffs Cw1 ,w2)change. 
More formally, the Nash solution can be viewed as a mapping from 
the set feasible conflict situations, WCE), into the set of 
attainable welfare allocations that is also equal to WCE). For 
our purposes it is convenient to express this mapping by two func-
A1 A2 2 A, - - A2 - -
tions N and N from IR+ toll\ such that [ N Cw1 ,w2 ), N Cw1 ,w2 )] is 
the Nash solution to the bargaining game, if Cw1 ,w2 ) is its prede-
termined conflict situation. This formulation suggests that the 
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selection of disagreement payoffs is an important part of the 
bargaining problem. Therefore the conflict situation should be 
"endogeneous" to the model, thus leading to a so-called general 
(as opposed to simple) two-person bargaining game. 
Of course, it is not possible for any country to determine its 
own or the other country's disagreement payoff since e 1 and e 2 
are arguments in both welfare functions. But each country can 
announce a national emission level to be implemented in case 
that no agreement would be reached. Let ei denote the conflict 
emission levels that have been chosen by country i• Then, by 
definition, 
(9) (i=1,2) 
Each tuple (e 1 ,e 2 ) determines a conflict situation. Therefore e1 
ande 2 arealso called threat strategies. It will be assumed that 
these threats are binding in the sense that the countries are 
bound to implement them if they later fail to reach agreement. 34 ) 
This assumption appears to be plausible in the case of inter-
national negotiations where the fear of loosing face or inter-
national reliability is a strong enforcement mechanism. In summa-
ry, the general bargaining game with binding threats operates as 
follows: The countries choose their threat strategies e 1 and e 2 
at the beginning of the game thus defining the conflict situa-
tions via eq. (9). The disagreement payoffs 1~,,~2 ) in turn 
determine the agreement payoffs (w 1 ,w2 ) by the simple bargaining 
game as described in the previous section. 
Now the interesting and important question arises which threat 
strategy should be chosen by each country. Is there an optimal 
threat strategy for each country and, furthermore, are there 
mutually compatible optimal strategies for both countries? Since 
both countries' welfare is interdependent, each country can 







only choose a threat strategy which is optimal in the sence of 
welfare maximizing relative to some given threat strategy of the 
other country. "Intuitively an optimal threat strategy in Nash's 
sense is the threat strategy maximizing the relative strength of 
one's bargaining position against the opponent. It represents the 
best possible compromise between trying to maximize the costs of 
a conflict to the opponent and trying to minimize the costs of a 
conflict to oneself."]S) In figures 9 and 10 a geometric inter-
pretation is given. Suppose that the predetermined strategy 0 1 
of country 1 is equal to OA in figure 9. Then, choosing a threat 
strategy 0 2 E E2 is for country 2 equivalent to selecting a point 
on the dotted line ABCDE. Each point on this locus uniquely de-
fines a welfare tuple since a welfare indifference curve of both 
countries passes through each point. Therefore the line AE can be 
mapped into the welfare space of figure 10, yielding some line 
A' B' C' D' E'. Observe that in C (and C') country 2's welfare· is 
maximal and that in one and only one point such as B (B') the 
welfare possibility frontier is hit. Figure 10 suggests to inter-
prete country 2's maximizing procedure as the problem to choose 
the best possible conflict point from the line A' B' C' D' E', 
where the best one means the point which yields the highest wel-
fare for country 2 in the associated Nash solution (of the simple 
bargaining game). In figure 10 the points A", B" etc. are supposed 
to be the Nash solutions of alternative simple bargaining games 
with conflict situations A', B' etc., respectively. Let D" be the 
Nash solution with the greatest w2-coordinate and suppose that D' 
is the conflict situation corresponding to D". Associated to the 
point D' in figure 10 there is the point Din figure 9. Hence 0 2 
= OG (in figure 9) is the optimal strategy for country 2 when 
the other country's threat strategy is given by a1 = OA. It is 
clear that the situation described in figures 9 and 10 can only 
serve as an example. But one can easily see from figure 10 that 
the optimal conflict point from country 2's point of view must lie 
somewhere on the non-decreasing line segment E' C'. 
35) J. Harsanyi (1977, p. 170n.). 
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In order to establish the existence of mutually optimal threat 
strategies we look at the two stage bargaining problem described 
above as a two-person game with strategy spaces E1 and E2 and 
with payoff functions 
where the functions N1and N2 are those that were introduced on 
p. . This reformulation clearly shows that we generated a game 
that is formally analogous to that of sections 2 und 3.1. Mutual-
~y optimal threat strategies are thus equivalent to an equilib-
1 2 1 2 rium point for the game GN := { 2, N , N , E , E }. Nash has 
shown 36 ) that under the assumptions used in this paper a pair of 
mutually optimal strategies always exists and that in the case of 
multiple solutions all pairs of mutually optimal strategies are 
interchangeable. This implies that the welfare allocation being 
a solution to the general bargaining game is unique. 
Harsanyi gives two interesting characterizations of mutually op-
timal threat strategies which will not be considered here in 
analytical detai1. 37 > Basically his results are that a country 
achieves a higher final welfare level: 
1. The greater its own willingness, and the lesser the other 
country's willingness, to risk a conflict in order to obtain 
better terms. 
2. The greater its welfare gain associated with a small welfare 
loss of the other country on the upper right boundary of the 
set of attainable welfare allocations. 
3. The greater damage that it could cause to the other country 
at a given cost to itself and the lesser damage that the other 
country could cause to its opponent at given cost to itself. 
36) See J .F. Nash, ( 1953). 
37) J. Harsanyi (1977, p. 169 n., in particular p. 179) • 
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Even though the concept of mutually optimal threat strategies 
appears to be satisfactory on a conceptual level its immediate 
application to empirical issues of RTP will be extremely diffi-
cult because of the tremendous informational requirements. In 
particular, one would like to use this solution concept in order 
to evaluate actually implemented strategies for international 
negotiations but this would also require full computation of the 
"optimum". In spite of these limitations some interesting con-
clusions with respect to unilateral emission reductions can be 
drawn from the theoretical model. 
4.3 Unilateral Pre-bargaining Regulation 
With respect to the issue of international negotiations in RTP 
problems it is important to observe that the initial emission 
allocation did not play any role in the theory of mutually opti-
mal threat strategies of section 4.2. In fact, as long as the 
countries convincingly announce that their strategy sets are E1 
and E2 , respectively, for the bargaining game to be played, then 
the actual emissions are irrelevant for their relative bargaining 
power and hence for the solution of the game. On the other hand, 
suppose that before bargaining country 1 implements a unilateral re-
duction of emission from e~ to e 1 <e~ and determines not to in-
crease its emission in the future. This procedure means in terms 
of our model that the country 1's strategy set E1 is reduced to 
E1 := [o,e1J which is a propper subset of E1 . Consequently the 
game to be played is different from that one whose strategy sets 
are E1 and E2 . Denote by G the general bargaining game described 
in section 4.2 in which the strategy sets are E1 and E2 and let 
G' be the game which differs from G only in that E1 is substitu-
ted for E1 . Since E1 c E1 and E1 *E1 , we have also W(E) =>W(E') and 
W(E) * W(E'), where E' := E1 XE 2 and where W(E') is the payoff set 
of the game G'. Suppose further that (w1 ,w2 ) E W(E) is the 1;1nique 
~ ~ I i > solution to the game G and that H(w1 ,w2 ) := { (0 1 ,0 2 ) EE N (0 1 ,0 2 
= w. for i=1,2} is the set of joint threat strategies leading to 
l. 
this solution. Similarly let (w 1 ,w2 ) EW(E') be t~e solution to 
the game G' and let H <w, ,w2) := { (81 ,62) EE' J Nl.(0, ,82) = wi for 
i= 1,2}be the corresponding set of joint threat strategies. 
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It is now interesting to inquire into the conditions for 
(w 1,w2 ) * (w 1 ,w2 ). Note first that if the unequality holds then 
the change in payoffs is to the advantage of country 2. More 
precisely, then w1 <w1 and w2 >w2 • This is so because by its 
decision to substitute E1 for E1 country 1 cuts off favourable 
welfare options for itself but only unfavourable ones for the 
other country. For an illustration of this effect suppose that 
the maximum emission e 1 of country 1 is equal to OA in figure 9. 
Then the joint strategy set E' of the game G' is represented by 
the area OAEH in figure 9. This area contains all high level in-
difference curves for country 2 whereas country 1 looses favou-
rable welfare options. 
The answer to the question under which conditions w1 <w1 and 
w2 >w2 follows immediately from the postulate of "independence 
of irrelevant alternatives": (w 1 ,w2 ) * (w1 ,w2 ) if and only if 
(w 1 ,w2 ) tw(E') or (0 1 ,0 2)¢E' for some (0 1 ,0 2 )EH(w1 ,w2 ). It 
should be emphasized that (w1 ,w2 ) E W(E') is not sufficient for 
(w 1 ,w2 ) = (w 1 ,w2 ). This result may appear to be counter-intuiti-
ve, but it can easily be shown with the help of the figures 9 
and 10. Suppose as in the last paragraph that in figure 9 the 
set E' of game G' is represented by the area OAEH. Further, let 
B" in figure 10 be the solution of the unrestricted game G. Since 
B" corresponds to the point Bin figure 9 we clearly have lw1 ,w2 ) 
E W(E'). We have to show that B" in figure 10 or Bin figure 9 
cannot be the solution to the restricted game G'. Consider there-
fore the set EB:= { (81,82) EE' I wic0,,02) .'.: wi for i=1,2 }which 
is the set of all points in the shaded area in figure 9. Clearly, 
1 2 ~ ~ ,. we have [N (0 1 ,0 2 ), N (0 1 ,0 2 )h(w1 ,w2 ), if (0 1 ,0 2 ) 11-EB. Our claim 
is proved if it is true that for any given 01 E E' 1 there exists 
d- 2 ~ -0 2 EE 2 such that 10 1 ,0 2 ) ~EB and N 10 1 ,0 2 ) >w2 • Let 0 1 <e1 and 
select 02 EE 2 such that the condition (8) is satisfied for the 
pair (e 1 = 01 , e 2 = 02). In other words, in figure 9 (01 ,02 ) is 
a point on the (dotted) "efficiency line" LK to the left of the 
1 - - 2 - -point B, and [ W (0 1 ,0 2), W (0 1 ,0 2 )] is a point on 
1 - -possibility frontier. For this reason, [ N (0 1 ,0 2), 
the welfare 
2 - -N <0 1 ,0 2)] = 
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1-- 2-- 2--(W (e 1 ,e 2J, W (e 1 ,e 2 )]. But we clearly have N (e 1 ,e 2 )> w2 and 
(01 ,02 ) ~EB. Suppose now that e1 = e 1. Then the foreign country 
may choose e 2 = OK ( in figure 9) , in which case (e 1 fl 2 ) ¢ EB and 
w2 (e1 ,e2 ) >w2 . From the postulate of individual rationality we 
2 ~ ~ > 2 ~ ~ know that N (e 1 ,e 2 ) - W (e 1 ,e 2 ). Hence it is proved that the 
point Bin figure 9 cannot be the solution to the restricted 
game G' with strategy space OAEH. 
In summary, this section has shown that a unilateral reduction 
of emissions by one country may influence the outcome of the 
bargaining process in favour of the other country if the reduc-
tion is "strong" and if the regulating country does not or cannot 
convince the other country that it is determined to adopt less 
restrictive emission regulation in case of a conflict. 
4.4. Strategic Manipulation 
Itis a characteristic feature of many RTP problems that the infor-
mation on adverse pollution effects and their proper evaluation 
is highly uncertain. Further scientific research and evidence 
may not exclude the possibility that considerably diverging natio-
nal damage assessments can be defended without being obviously 
incompatible with the available "knowledge". This is particularly 
true in global RTP situations that concern the stratosphere. For 
example, in the case of the CFCs-ozone problem in the United Sta-
tes the administration and several scientists emphasized that 
they expect significant damage from CFCs releases for their coun-
try. This position has been substantiated by the U.S. unilateral 
pre-bargaining CFCs regulation. On the other hand it appears that 
in Europe there was and still is less concern about the ozone 
issue. 
Suppose now that in our two-country model country 2 is less con-
cerned in the beginning but that it then reconsiders the problem 
carefully and reaches about the same conclusion on damage assess-
ment as the other country. Then the important question is whether 
the revelation of true jugdement is in country 2's self-interest. 
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Has it an incentive to behave strategically38 l and pretend 
(despite better knowledge) that in its view the damage is minor 
than it really "knows" it is? The answer is in the affirmative 
if its welfare position in a bargaining solution with "cheating" 
is better than its welfare when "the game is played with open 
card". 
In order to see that cheating may be advantageous we consider for 
simplicity the extreme case where country 2 pretends that pollu-
tion from residuals emission has no detrimental effects on its 
own economy. Suppose that figure 6 contains the true welfare 
indifference curves for both countries. However, the indifferen-
.-i:t-2 A2 
ce lines that are reported by country2 satisfy Ws =Ts= O. They 
are straight lines parallel to the horizontal axis in figure 6, 
such that the welfare index increases with increasing distance 
from the horizontal axis. If the (simple or general) bargaining 
game is played with the true characteristics of the country 1 and 
with the misrepresented characteristics of country 2, the solu-
tion will always be the point Hin figure 6 since the optimal 
0 threat strategy of country 2 is 0 2 = e 2 . 
The possible advantage of misrepresentation can be seen by com-
paring it with the alternative option of true revelation. There-
fore consider the case that country 2 reports the true preferen-
ces as drawn in figure 6 but chooses non-cooperative behaviour. 
Then the equilibrium points in figure 6 will be selected as a 
solution. Country 2's (true) indifference curves in figure 6 are 
such that its welfare level in Sis lower than that in point H. 
Hence figure 6 is an example for the case in which misrepresen-
tation is superior to preference revelation combined with non-
cooperative behaviour. 39 ) Thesecondalternative, that is, prefe-
38) The issue of strategic manipulation has become well-known in 
the context of the theory of voting and in the theory of pub-
lic goods. The relevant literature and an analytical treat-
ment of the problem is given in R. Pethig (1978). 
39) Observe that the assumption of complete denial of damage is 
not essential for the argument. It would take, however, consi-
derable analytical effort to show this result with "moderate" 
underrating of damages. 
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rence revelation on both sides and cooperation, cannot be com-
puted so easily without additional quantitative specification 
of the welfare functions involved. The following qualitative 
statement clarifies, however, the essential point. If the solu-
tion of the (general) bargaining game corresponds to a point on 
the dotted line segment NG in figure 6, then misrepresentation 
of preferences is in country 2's self-interest. 
There is no intrinsic reason why manipulative strategies as 
outlined above for the case of country 2 areasymmetricbetween 
countries. Even though one may interprete one country's unila-
teral pre-bargaining regulation as an implicit preference reve-
lation, it is conceivable that this country also engages in stra-
tegic misrepresentation of its characteristics. The country may 
pretend to have revised its previous damage assessment downward 
in the hope of some extra welfare gains. 
Finally, we wish to emphasize that it is not the purpose of this 
subsection to recommend strategic manipulation to any country as 
a device to solve RTP problems. In our view there is a serious 
environmental threat to many countries that should not be consi-
dered as·an entertaining poker game. The theorist wishes to check, 
however, whether the solution concepts studied or proposed are 
individually incentive-compatible. Our analysis suggests that 
this is not the case. 
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